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INTRODUCTION
A tragedy looms for trade dress. Encouraged by bad case law and
tempted by new technologies, trade dress law threatens to assume a
role properly reserved for other forms of intellectual property. Trade
dress should aim primarily at protecting the public from confusing
the features that identify goods and services. Current trends, how-
ever, risk expanding trade dress until it constitutes the very commodi-
ties1 that it once merely identified. Superficially genuine but
fundamentally artificial, this is virtual trade dress.2
Virtual trade dress stakes out rights more enduring, and in many
respects more broad, than either copyright or patent would provide.
Though already evident in case law, virtual trade dress poses a particu-
lar threat of overrunning its ideal habitat: virtual reality.3 Despite its
potential impact, virtual trade dress has largely escaped the notice of
commentators and courts.4 Commentary on trade dress law, flowing
down two separate channels, has left unexplored the issues raised by
1. As used herein, "commodities" stands for goods, or services, or both.
2. As used herein, "virtual trade dress" refers to a distinct type of trade dress, the exact
scope of which will become clear in the discussion to follow.
3. This Article uses as synonyms "virtual reality" and "virtual environments."
4. Only two cases directly concern trade dress protection of virtual environments-
specifically, software user interfaces-and these cases fail to offer much legal analysis. See
Interactive Network, Inc. v. NTN Communications, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1398, 1407 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (denying trade dress protection on functionality grounds); Engineering Dynamics,
Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 576, 583 (E.D. La. 1991) (denying trade dress
protection on grounds that confusion was not likely), aff'd in relevant part, 26 F.3d 1335
(5th Cir. 1994).
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virtual trade dress. On the one hand, a good many articles have dis-
cussed trade dress protection of computer interfaces.5 These articles
regard trade dress as merely another tool, of greater or lesser utility,
for protecting the "look and feel" of computer software. On the other
hand, a smaller number of articles have noted the encroachment of
trade dress on territory properly reserved for other forms of intellec-
tual property.6 These articles, however, fail to recognize that virtual
trade dress poses a disproportionate threat to digital services.
5. See, e.g., Lauren Fisher Kellner, Computer User Intefaces: Trade Dress Protection for
"Look and Feel, "84 TRADEMARK REP. 337 (1994) [hereinafter Kellner, Computer User] (argu-
ing that trade dress law offers adequate protection for the "look and feel" of user inter-
faces); Lauren Fisher Kellner, Comment, Trade Dress Protection for Computer User Inteface
"Look and Feel, "61 U. CHI. L. Rv. 1011 (1994) [hereinafter Kellner, Trade Dress] (same); H.
Dale Langley, Jr., Tamale Sales and Carburetor Tune-Ups: The Implications for Computer Software
Developers and Owners-A Trade Dress Analysis, 3 TEx. INTELL. PROP. Lj. 9 (1994) (conclud-
ing that recent trade dress decisions indicate the applicability of the doctrine to computer
software); Ken Liebman et al., The Shape of Things to Come: Trademark Protection for Com-
puters, 9 No. 12 COMPUTER LAw. 1 (1992) (examining trademark and unfair competition
law's protection of hardware and software designs); Lisa T. Oratz, User Interfaces: Copyright
vs. Trade Dress Protection, 13 No. 1 COMPUTER LAw. 1 (1996) (discussing whether trade dress
protection is a viable alternative to copyright protection of user interfaces); Rhoda L Rud-
nick, Window Dressing: Trademark Protection for Computer Screen Displays and Software, 80
TRADEMARK REP. 382 (1990) (suggesting that trade dress protection of operating system
software might include the graphic elements of the system); Steven Schortgen, Note,
"Dressing" up Software Interface Protection: The Application of Two Pesos to "Look and Feel, "80
CORNELL L. REv. 158 (1994) (arguing that graphic user interfaces should be protected
under the trade dress doctrine); Matthew E. Watson, Trade Dress Theory and the Software
Graphic User Interface: Sorting Through the Gooey Mess, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 251 (1994) (arguing
that trade dress law is not a viable alternative to copyright and patent law for the protection
of graphic user interfaces); Gregory J. Wrenn, Comment, Federal Intellectual Property Protec-
tion for Computer Software Audiovisual Look and Feel: The Lanham, Copyright, and Patent Acts, 4
HIGH TECH. L.J. 279, 281 (1990) (proposing that the Lanham Act's functionality doctrine
"be adopted for analyzing the ideal expression dichotomy in copyright law, as well as the
functional/nonfunctional distinction of design patent protection"); Mitchell Zimmerman,
Trade Dress Protection for User Intefaces Revisited and Interred?, 13 No. 2 COMPUTER LAw. 4
(1996) (arguing that recent cases threaten efforts to protect user interfaces as trade dress).
6. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341
(1987) (criticizing the use of unfair competition to expand the protection of the shape
and appearance of goods); Melissa R. Gleiberman, Note, From Fast Cars to Fast Food: Over-
broad Protection of Product Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REv.
2037 (1993) (criticizing the use of § 43(a) to protect product designs); RonaldJ. Horta,
Without Secondary Meaning, Do Product Design Trade Dress Protections Function As Infinite Pat-
ents?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 113, 114 (1993) (arguing that the expansion of trade dress
protection and the extension of the definition of trade dress created "monopolies of un-
limited duration to product design features and blunts the role of design patents in intel-
lectual property law"). But see DanielJ. Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and
Trade Dress, 75 MINN. L. REv. 769 (1991) (approving the expansion of trade dress as a
means of encouraging innovation).
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Virtual trade dress has slipped past courts most frequently when
embodied in goods mistakenly protected as trade dress.7 Courts have
also unwittingly granted virtual trade dress rights to services-restau-
rants in particular.' Only rather recently have courts begun to recog-
nize the hazards of trade dress that, however traditional it appears,
radically upsets intellectual property's time-tested order.9
Cases establishing virtual trade dress rights in services, though
facially less egregious than those establishing similar rights in goods,
set an especially troubling precedent. Virtual trade dress in goods
cannot expand too far before it clearly transgresses copyright and pat-
ent law. These sorts of intellectual property have relatively little sway
over services, however, leaving virtual trade dress free to take over the
field. Being primarily interactive and service-based, rather than fixed
and concrete, virtual environments will prove especially vulnerable to
virtual trade dress.
Advocates of virtual reality predict that it will provide computer
simulations that effectively duplicate our perceptions of the real
world.1" Better yet, virtual reality will provide convincing experiences
not available in real space, such as walking through fifteenth-century
Rome or viewing cellular machinery from the inside out. At present,
virtual reality offers more promise than profit.11 Trends indicate,
7. See, e.g., Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (discussed infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hall-
mark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Colo. 1986) (discussed infra notes 40-69 and ac-
companying text), affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
8. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773 (1992) (discussed
infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc.,
826 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussed infra notes 86-100 and accompanying text).
9. See, e.g., Duraco Prods., Inc. v.Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1452 (3d Cir.
1994) (discussed infra notes 109-134 and accompanying text).
10. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, VIRTUAL REALIT- SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNO-
LOGICAL CHALLENGES 13 (1995) ("In virtual reality (VR) or virtual environment (VE) sys-
tems, the human operator is connected to a computer that can simulate a wide variety of
worlds, both real and imaginary."); HOwARD RHEINGOLD, VIRTUAL REALrry 17 (1991) ("In
the future, less intrusive technologies will be used to create the same experience, and the
computers will be both more powerful and less expensive, which means the virtualities will
be more realistic and more people will be able to afford to visit them."); Brenda Laurel,
Virtual Reality, Sci. Am., Sept. 1995, at 90, 90 ("The important thing about VR is what it does
rather than how its effects are achieved: it permits people to behave as if they were some-
where they are not.").
11. Analysts calculate that virtual reality games and accessories total about $90 million
in consumer sales a year at present, but that the same market will generate about $6 billion
in annual consumer sales by 2001. See Howard Wolinsky, Cyberspace Poised for 3-D; Industry
Crafts a New 'Reality,' CHI. SuN-TIMES, June 16, 1996 (Connected), at 45, available in 1996
WL 6750364.
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however, that virtual reality will eventually support a wide array of en-
tertainment, information, and communication services.1
2
Nothing this good comes cheaply. To build convincing and effec-
tive virtual realities will consume much time, effort, and money.
Those who develop virtual realities will want protection against copy-
ing that aims at skimming the cream off of their creative efforts.
These developers-or, rather, their attorneys-will undoubtedly seek
protection through all possible means. Given current case law, they
will find trade dress protection all too useful.
Why consider now the impact of trade dress law on a technology
still far from everyday use? As so often happens with new technolo-
gies, we may find ourselves deep into virtual reality sooner than we
expect. We will then probably regret not having addressed the legal
issues earlier, at our leisure. More important, virtual reality provides
an imaginary laboratory for examining current law. As an environ-
ment constituted solely of information, virtual reality submits intellec-
tual property law to something akin to "white room" conditions.
Thus, well before it comes to fruition-or even regardless of whether
it does-virtual reality can help to detect and amplify existing legal
problems. This examination satisfies more than merely theoretical in-
terests. Much of what one concludes about virtual environments will
hold true of other artificial environments, such as conventional com-
puter interfaces, restaurants, theme parks, and architectural spaces.
In questioning whether trade dress should protect future virtual envi-
ronments, therefore, this Article provides new grounds for question-
ing trade dress protection here and now.
By reviewing conventional notions of trademark and trade dress
law, Part I of this Article lays the groundwork for the text that follows.
Part II gives a brief description of virtual trade dress, contrasting it
with real trade dress. Part III discusses how courts have created, and
on at least one occasion criticized, virtual trade dress rights in goods
and services. Part IV contends that standard justifications for trade
dress fit virtual trade dress poorly. Part V sets forth a variety of eco-
nomic, legal, and policy arguments against creating virtual trade dress
rights. Projecting current trends, Part VI explores how virtual trade
dress might come to protect virtual environments. This Article con-
12. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 3 (concluding that the potential
for practical uses of virtual reality is especially evident in training; hazardous operations;
medicine and health care; and design, manufacturing, and marketing); see also RHEINGOLD,
supra note 10, at 171 (discussing virtual reality projects, such as public access virtual en-
tertainment parlors, surgical simulations, and financial systems visualization).
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cludes that not checking virtual trade dress now, while it remains a
mere anomaly, would give it license to grow into a very real problem.
I. TRADEMARK VS. TRADE DREss
Although often treated as a subcategory of trademark law, trade
dress in fact represents a unique sort of intellectual property. The
Supreme Court has defined trade dress as the "'total image and over-
all appearance"' of a good,'" further specifying that it "'may include
features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture,
graphics, or even particular sales techniques."'1 4 Trade dress thus en-
compasses a more diffuse set of intellectual properties than does
trademark law. The scope of trade dress protection includes subjects
as concrete as decorative tiles and as abstract as restaurant service. 15
Moreover, trade dress covers various combinations of these concrete
and abstract subjects.
Even though courts have not hesitated to apply the Lanham Act 6
to trade dress, they lack readily apparent authority to do so. The term
"trade dress" appears nowhere among the terms defined in section
1127 of the Lanham Act, nor does it appear in any of the Act's other
provisions. Yet the Supreme Court recently confirmed that this la-
cuna will not prevent the Lanham Act from applying to trade dress.' 7
Did the Court thereby usurp Congress? Hardly. Judicial con-
struction of the Lanham Act has long established its applicability to
trade dress,'" and Congress appears to have accepted this interpreta-
13. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764-65 n.1 (quoting Blue Bell Bio-Med. v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864
F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989)).
14. Id. (quotingJohn H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (lth
Cir. 1983)).
15. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
16. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1994)).
17. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776 (holding that inherently distinctive trade dress falls
within the protection of the Lanham Act, regardless of proof that it acquired a secondary
meaning).
18. See id. at 780 (Stevens, J, concurring) ("The federal courts are in agreement that
§ 43(a) creates a federal cause of action for trademark and trade dress infringement
claims.") (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991)
(shape of Ferrari's Daytona Spider and Testarossa protected); Nabisco Brands, Inc. v.
Conusa Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1287 (M.D.N.C.) (shape of Lifesavers candies protected), affd,
892 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1989); L.A. Gear Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (design of athletic shoes protected), affd, 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Sunbeam Corp. v. Equity Indus. Corp., 635 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Va. 1986) (shape of food
processor protected), affd, 811 F.2d 1505 (4th Cir. 1987).
1997]
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tion.1 The broad reach of trademark's common law roots alsojusti-
fies extending it to trade dress.20 Most decisively, trade dress easily fits
into the Lanham Act's generous definition of "trade-mark": "any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof' used to
identify goods.2"
Whether due to the Lanham Act's inclusive language or the gen-
eral preeminence of trademark law, most authorities treat trade dress
as a proper subset of trademark law.22 The wiser view, however, recog-
nizes that trade dress and trademark merely overlap. In Vision Sports,
Inc. v. Melville Corp., 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit noted some distinctive features of trade dress:
Trade dress protection is broader in scope than trademark
protection, both because it protects aspects of packaging and
product design that cannot be registered for trademark protec-
tion and because evaluation of trade dress infringement
claims requires the court to focus on the plaintiffs entire sell-
ing image, rather than the narrower single facet of
trademark.24
Furthermore, trade dress may cover not only a selling image, but a
selling method.25
19. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, S. REP. No. 100-515, at 40, reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5602.
20. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 778-83 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also 20th Century
Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 1984) ("At common law, of
course, trademark or tradename infringement was only one form of tort encompassed
under the concept of unfair competition, a concept that also included 'passing off one's
goods as those of another' and imitation of the trade dress of another.") (citations
omitted).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994); see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773 (applying the definition
of "trademark" in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 to trade dress). Section 1127 defines "service mark" in
equally broad terms, 15 U.S.C. § 1127, as does section 1125(a) (1), under which many trade
dress claims get litigated. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
The common law of most states affords similar protection to trade dress, but it is
doubtful that those laws provide any broader protection than claims brought under section
1125(a) of the Lanham Act. See Liebman et al., supra note 5, at 5. This Article thus pays
little heed to state laws.
22. See, e.g., Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773 (stating that "§43(a) provides no basis for distin-
guishing between trademark and trade dress").
23. 888 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1989).
24. Id. at 613 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
25. See Two Peos, 505 U.S. at 764-65 n.1; see also Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others,
Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1987) (protecting trade dress that included the offer of a
restaurant "newspaper" and free bones for customers' dogs). But see Prufrock Ltd. v.
Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that "method and style of doing
business" is excluded from the definition of trade dress).
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The fact that trade dress may take too vague a form to permit
registration deserves emphasis.26 The Lanham Act requires an appli-
cant for registration to provide the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) with a "drawing" of the mark (or, by extension, trade dress)
submitted for application.2 7 An applicant would find it impossible to
draw the aggregate effect of a restaurant's "decor, menu, layout and
style of service," to cite one example of federally protectable trade
dress,28 nor will such a collection of appearances and actions readily
submit to a verbal description. If such vagueness keeps a trade dress
claim off the principal register, imagine what it does to parties trying
to avoid an unfair competition suit brought under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.2 9 These parties can neither search federal registrations
for similar trade dress, nor benefit from similarly text-bound state and
commercial records, nor ascertain with certainty the scope of the
trade dress that they happen to locate.3 0
These differences between trade dress and trademark call for
treating them differently. Nevertheless, courts tend to treat trade
dress like any other form of intellectual property covered by the Lan-
ham Act.31 This failure to account for the unique features of trade
dress has helped give rise to the problem at hand: virtual trade dress.
II. VIRTUAL TRADE DREss vs. REAL TRADE DREss
Before examining how courts have created virtual trade dress
rights, and the theoretical objections to their having done so, it may
prove helpful to highlight the differences between virtual trade dress
and real trade dress. Consider the following contrasts: Virtual trade
dress arises when a court gives trade dress protection to exactly the
same commodity that consumers value. Real trade dress has little intrinsic
value. Consumers value virtual trade dress for its own qualities, purely
for the aesthetic experience that it provides. Consumers value real trade
dress primarily because it reveals the otherwise hidden qualities of a
26. See Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 613. Some trade dress claims do, of course, qualify for
the principal register. See, e.g., Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 868 (8th
Cir. 1994) ("Indeed, trade dress may now be registered on the Principal Register of the
PTO.").
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), (b) (1994).
28. Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 841.
29. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 43, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (1994)).
30. See Horta, supra note 6, at 132-33 (stating that either courts should retain the secon-
dary meaning requirement so as to compensate for the lack of notice afforded by unregis-
tered trade dress, or the PTO should create a registry for trade dress).
31. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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good or service, whereas virtual trade dress points to other qualities
only incidentally, if at all.
These contrasts between virtual and real trade dress push their
definitions to extremes, of course. The line dividing them blurs a bit
in the real world. Just as the existence of dawn and dusk does not
prove that night equals day, however, virtual trade dress and real trade
dress remain distinct. Far from hiding similarities, theoretically pure
definitions help to categorize the fuzzy facts that pervade actual prac-
tice. 2 Fortunately, case law provides both mixed and unalloyed exam-
ples of virtual trade dress.
III. CASE LAW ON VIRTUAL TRADE DREss
Virtual trade dress has already surfaced in case law. To best illus-
trate judicial recognition of virtual trade dress rights, the cases ana-
lyzed in this Part-Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,33 Romm
Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha International, Inc., 4 Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's
B.R Others, Inc.,35 and Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.36 -necessar-
ily present extreme results. Nonetheless, these cases have proven in-
fluential, and they help bring to the fore factors implicit in other
cases.37 Case law contrary to virtual trade dress rights runs a bit thin.
Even courts that have denied suspect claims have generally failed to
do so for the right reasons.3 8 The recent decision in Duraco Products,
Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd.39 represents a notable exception to
this rule.
A. Virtual Trade Dress in Goods
1. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.-Hartford House
stands out as the single best example of a court's creating virtual trade
32. For an explanation and justification of such reasoning, see ALBERT R. JONSEN &
STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY (1988).
33. 674 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Colo. 1986), affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
34. 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
35. 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987).
36. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
37. Examining Hartford House, Romm Art, Fuddruckers, and Two Pesos as a group, more-
over, invites original observations. Few commentaries tie all of the product and service
cases together. One treatise even ignores the relation between Hartford House and Romm
Art. SeeJ. THOMAS McCARTHY, 1 TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6.04[2], at 6-27
n.20; § 7.26[71, at 7-151 n.143 (3d ed. 1996). But seeGifford, supra note 6, at 789 (examin-
ing the combined effect of the Fuddruckers and Hartford House decisions).
38. See, e.g., American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1143
(3d Cir. 1986) (denying trade dress protection on grounds of functionality to emotive
.tummy graphics" on stuffed "Care Bears").
39. 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
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dress. Hartford House, together with others, manufactured and dis-
tributed greeting cards under the name Blue Mountain Arts (Blue
Mountain).4 Blue Mountain sued rival Hallmark Cards (Hallmark)
for infringing the trade dress of two lines of Blue Mountain's cards-
"AireBrush Feelings" and "Watercolor Feelings."41 The district court
found inherently distinctive and highly uniform features in these two
card lines, features that combined in an overall appearance consum-
ers could recognize and attribute to Blue Mountain.42 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.4" The list of
inherently distinctive and highly uniform features included:
1. A two-fold card containing poetry on the first page and
the third page.
2. Unprinted surfaces on the inside three panels.
3. A deckle edge on the right-side of the first page.
4. A rough edge stripe of color, or wide stripe, on the
outside of the deckle edge of the first page.
5. A high quality, uncoated and textured art paper for the
cards.
6. Florescent ink for some of the colors printed on the
cards.
7. Lengthy poetry, written in free verse, typically with a per-
sonal message.
8. Appearance of hand-lettered calligraphy on the first and
third page with the first letter of the words often
enlarged.
9. An illustration that wraps around the card and is spread
over three pages, including the back of the card.
10. The look of the cards primarily characterized by back-
grounds of soft colors done with air brush blends or light
watercolor strokes, usually depicting simple contrasting
foreground scenes superimposed in the background.'
This collection of features qualifies as virtual trade dress because it
constitutes the very good that consumers value. Taking these features
away leaves only plain paper.
Although a competitor would not have to forego copying all of
these features to avoid infringing Blue Mountain's supposed trade
40. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1536 (D. Colo.
1986), affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
41. Id. at 1537.
42. Id. at 1544.
43. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1275.
44. Hartford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1539.
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dress, the scope of Blue Mountain's rights remained vague.45 At any
rate, together or apart, the listed features qualify as virtual trade dress.
They constitute the very goods that consumers value; taking them
away leaves only plain paper. As this analysis demonstrates, Blue
Mountain would earn no profit without selling the features covered by
its trade dress claim.
Such virtual trade dress does not fit well within the rubric of real
trade dress law. The district court in Hartford House adopted the stan-
dard trademark framework for judging trade dress infringement. It
required Blue Mountain to show that its trade dress was (1) nonfunc-
tional, (2) distinctive,' and (3) likely to be confused by consumers
with the defendant's trade dress.47 In each of these steps, however,
the court's failure to recognize the virtual trade dress at issue led it
astray.
a. Functionality.-The district court in Hartford House de-
fined as functional a feature "'essential to the use or purpose of the
article or that affects the cost or quality of the article.'" 48 In the de
jure, if not in the de facto sense, the functionality test boils down to
asking whether protecting the trade dress in question "'will hinder
competition or impinge on the right of others to compete in the sale
of goods."'49 The district court found Blue Mountain's card design
nonfunctional because competitors had access to alternative de-
signs.5" The appellate court affirmed that finding.5" More careful
consideration, however, reveals that this standard analysis of function-
ality goes awry when applied to virtual trade dress.
With virtual trade dress, what counts as an "alternative" design
depends on the definition of the relevant market. Define the market
45. The Tenth Circuit claimed that because "the district court specifically listed the
combination of features that comprise Blue Mountain's protected trade dress, Hallmark is
guided as to what features combined may create a confusingly similar product." Hanford
House, 846 F.2d at 1275. The court confused the issue, however, by stating that "some or
all" of the features listed by the district court comprised the overall look of the Blue Moun-
tain product. Id. at 1270. This ambiguous determination leaves the scope of Blue Moun-
tain's trade dress rights quite vague.
46. This being prior to Two Pesos, the court required Hartford House to prove the
distinctiveness of its trade dress through a showing of secondary meaning. Two Pesos
opened the door to showing simply that trade dress has inherent distinctiveness. See infra
notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
47. Hartford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1537.
48. Id. (quoting Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850-51 n.10 (1982)).
49. Id. at 1540 (quoting Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir.
1984)).
50. Id. at 1541.
51. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1275.
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broadly--as all cards-and the reasoning in Hartford House stands.
Define it narrowly-as nonoccasion, emotionally expressive greeting
cards characterized by a hand-crafted appearance and free verse-and
it becomes evident that the Hartford House court protected not simply
trade dress, but an entire line of products.
In Hartford House, the record demonstrated that Hallmark copied
Blue Mountain's designs only after Hallmark had failed at wholly orig-
inal attempts to enter the market for the type of cards in question.52
The district court interpreted Hallmark's intentional copying as proof
that Blue Mountain's trade dress had achieved secondary meaning
and, thus, qualified as distinctive. 53  Because Blue Mountain's trade
dress covered the very good that consumers valued, however, Hall-
mark's copying demonstrated only that Blue Mountain had created a
profitable design scheme 54 -one that it either could not or would not
protect through a design patent or copyright.
55
Judges tend to frown on intentional copying.56 Yet in its zeal to
protect the David-sized Blue Mountain, the Hartford House court actu-
ally gave Goliath, Hallmark, new means to monopolize the card mar-
ket. With its vast resources to generate and test card designs,
Hallmark can now seize virtual trade dress rights to the best new
goods on the market. Furthermore, Hallmark's relatively vast litiga-
tion resources will cow lesser competitors that dare to probe the amor-
phous boundaries of its claims. Thus, while Hallmark lost the battle
in Hartford House, it won the war for broad and perpetual monopolies
on its most profitable card designs.
52. Hanford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1542.
53. Id. at 1542-43.
54. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v.Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1453 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[T]he copier may very well be exploiting a particularly desirable feature, rather than
seeking to confuse customers as to the source of the product.") (citations omitted).
55. Blue Mountain could undoubtedly have asserted a copyright against substantially
similar copies of its cards, though Hallmark presumably made its cards too dissimilar to
support such a claim. As an alternative to copyright or trade dress protection, could Blue
Mountain have won a design patent? The United States Patent and Trade Office appar-
ently regards a greeting card as an "article of manufacture" under 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
See Pioneer Photo Albums, Inc. v. Holson Co., 654 F. Supp. 87, 88 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (invali-
dating design patent in greeting card on other grounds). Blue Mountain's hypothetical
design patent would cover only its designs as embodied in its cards. Cf ExparteTayama, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1616 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f. 1992) ("[A] picture standing alone is not
protectable by a design patent."); In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 209 (C.C.P.A. 1931)
("[D]esign must be shown not to be the mere invention of a picture... but.., should be
required to show.., the manner of its application.").
56. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1044 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (finding that intentional copying should be deemed misconduct for purposes of
summaryjudgment); Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding
that conscious copying and accelerating infringing sales constitutes egregious conduct).
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b. Distinctiveness.-The district court in Hartford House also
employed a definition of functionality that relied on distinctiveness:
"A non-functional feature is one whose primary value is to identify the
source of the particular goods or services."5 7 On this measure, Blue
Mountain's putative trade dress fails miserably. Blue Mountain almost
certainly did not design its cards primarily to identify their source; its
trademark on the back of the cards served that function. Presumably,
Blue Mountain designed its cards primarily to satisfy consumer
demand.
In evaluating whether Blue Mountain's trade dress qualified as
distinctive, and thus protectable, the district court correctly observed
that "' [t] rademark strength is measured by its tendency to identify the
goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular source,
although possibly [an] anonymous source.""'5 This test works poorly,
however, on trade dress that constitutes exactly what consumers
value. 59
Courts ought not use trade dress law to grant perpetual copy-
rights.60 Yet a widely marketed copyright could give rise to exactly the
same sort of association with a particular source that the Hartford
House court cited as proof of distinctiveness.61 By failing to first ask
whether Blue Mountain's putative trade dress constituted virtual trade
dress, the court turned a distinctive good into a protected good.6" Of
course, if courts persist in protecting the types of design that consum-
ers value, consumers will eventually learn to associate a particular style
57. Hartford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1541.
58. Id. at 1538-39 (quoting Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 939
(10th Cir. 1983)).
59. For example, in Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1431, the Third Circuit stated: "[W]e do not
think it helpful or proper to transplant the categorical distinctiveness inquiry developed
for trademarks to product configurations, where the alleged trade dress lies in the very
product itself." Id. at 1440. The court reasoned:
[Ilnsofar as consumer motivation to purchase a product will much more likely be
predicated on an appreciation of a product's features than on an appreciation of
a product's name, assuming no secondary meaning attached to either, one can-
not automatically conclude from a product feature or configuration-as one can
from a product's arbitrary name, for example-that, to a consumer, it functions
primarily to denote the product's source.
Id. at 1441.
60. See infra Parts VI.B.2-C.
61. See infra Part VI.C.1.
62. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit instead asked whether
Blue Mountain had "been granted exclusive rights in an artistic style or in some concept,
idea, or theme of expression." Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d
1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 1988) (footnote omitted). Having framed the issue in such bloated
terms, the court concluded: "This protection does not extend the protection available
under trademark law and does not conflict with the policy of copyright law." Id
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with a particular source. That merely demonstrates the risk of a vi-
cious cycle of monopolization; it does not justify leaping into it.63
The district court also erred in citing Hallmark's intentional
copying as proof that Blue Mountain's trade dress had achieved secon-
dary meaning. 64 Hallmark did not copy Blue Mountain's design so
that it could pass off Hallmark cards as Blue Mountain cards. Hall-
mark's cards retained their trademarks. Furthermore, Hallmark did
not copy the card designs to free ride off of Blue Mountain's goodwill.
Blue Mountain had no goodwill to steal. Because, through inspec-
tion, a customer can perceive all of a card's qualities immediately,
there is no residual hidden value that a trademark or trade dress
could help to disclose. 65 What you see is what you get.6 6 Hallmark
copied Blue Mountain's cards solely to compete in offering consum-
ers a particular type of commodity, demonstrating that when it comes
to virtual trade dress, courts should not assume that intent to copy
indicates secondary meaning.67
c. Confusion.-The Hartford House courts, both higher and
lower, noted that consumers could not distinguish the two competing
card lines by reference to their stylistic features.6" That observation,
however, proves nothing about the validity of a trade dress claim, be-
cause the courts erred in judging the stylistic features as being non-
functional and distinctive. Consumers generally cannot distinguish
products protected by the same copyright or design patent, either.
63. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1447 ("We believe that courts should exercise restraint so as
not to undermine Congress's repeated determinations not to afford virtually perpetual
protection to product configurations with an expansive construction of section 43(a).").
64. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1543 (D. Colo.
1986), affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
65. One might argue that Blue Mountain's trade dress identifies the cards from a dis-
tance, allowing shoppers to zero in on the card rack holding their favorite brand. Trade
dress would thus reveal the value hidden by distance. This argument fails, however, be-
cause it (1) assumes that Blue Mountain deserves a monopoly in its product and (2) disre-
gards the fact that consumers still have ample opportunity to inspect the cards prior to
purchase.
66. See infra Part VA-B. (discussing the economic justifications for trade dress
protection).
67. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also William F. Gaske, Note, Trade Dress
Protection: Inherent Distinctiveness As an Alternative to Secondary Meaning, 57 FoRDHAm L, REv.
1123, 1136 (1989) ("A product's trade dress may be copied because of its attractive or
innovative design without any intention of taking advantage of consumer recognition, or
competitors may copy functional features that lack secondary meaning.") (footnote
omitted).
68. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1273; Hartford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1542.
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d. Breadth of the Virtual Trade Dress Protected.-Lastly, the dis-
trict court in Hartford House gave Blue Mountain a potentially immor-
tal right to a particular style of visual (not just card) design. Trade
dress claims can jump across product lines. The district court noted,
for example, that a ceramics manufacturer had purchased "a license
to replicate the Blue Mountain look on mugs and other ceramic
products."
69
As this parade of horribles indicates, Hartford House represents an
egregious example of how virtual trade dress can violate established
categories of intellectual property and wreak havoc on traditional
legal doctrines. Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha International, Inc.,7"
however, follows close behind.
2. Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha International, Inc.-In
Romm Art, as in Hartford House, a court created rights to virtual trade
dress by giving trade dress protection to the actual products that con-
sumers valued. Plaintiff Romm Art held a license to sell limited edi-
tions and posters copied from works in the "Women and Cafes"
collection of Israeli artist Itzchak Tarkay.71 Defendant Simcha distrib-
uted limited editions and posters of the work of artist Patricia
Govenzensky, which supposedly resembled Tarkay's work in terms of
patterns of color and shading, placement of figures, physical attrib-
utes and clothing of women portrayed, and depiction of women sit-
ting and reclining.72 Romm Art accused defendant Simcha of
distributing art "'slavishly similar and entirely derivative of " Tarkay's
work, and brought suit for trade dress infringement. 73
Simcha raised no objection to the magistrate's finding that the
Lanham Act provides relief for infringing the trade dress of commer-
cial reproductions of particular art works. 74 This proved fatal to the
defense.75 Relying heavily on Hartford House, the Romm Art court
found the trade dress nonfunctional76 and likewise upheld the magis-
trate's finding of secondary meaning 77 and likelihood of confusion. 78
69. Hartford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1543.
70. 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
71. Id. at 1130.
72. Id. at 1137.
73. Id. at 1131 (quoting Plaintiff's Complaint at 23).
74. Id. at 1132.
75. Id. at 1136.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1140.
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In Romm Art, as in Hartford House, the court cited absolutely no
feature of the artwork that consumers would value other than those
constituting the supposed trade dress.79 Intent on applying trade
dress law, the Romm Art court downplayed the real purpose of the art-
work, stating: "Other than aesthetic gratification, these images serve no
other purpose than to identify their source/creator.""° Of course, this
claim also holds true of the paintings of Van Gogh. Other than repre-
senting some of Western civilization's most compelling artworks, Van
Gogh's paintings do no more than identify the source of a particular
consumer good.
Perhaps the Romm Art court's emphasis on identification would
have made sense if the works in question had been unique collector
items, valuable regardless of their aesthetic value. As poster reproduc-
tions of the originals, however, these works held no special cachet.
The court could have bolstered its reasoning with a showing that the
works lacked labels clear enough to counteract any confusion caused
by their similar styles. Although the court observed that " It]he gen-
eral public's confusion is only increased when the name of the artist is
eliminated or covered up in the matting and/or cropping process,"81
it cited no evidence that this did or would actually occur.
Furthermore, that the products in question had no value besides
their virtual trade dress arguably makes attribution of source or origin
irrelevant. The prints, like the cards at issue in Hartford House, repre-
sented inspection goods. Failing to identify their source would not
have left any residual quality hidden. 2 Consumers got exactly what
they perceived, label or not. Here again, virtual trade dress contra-
vened the established taxonomy of intellectual property by providing
rights of indefinite duration to a particular style of design.8"
79. Id. at 1136.
80. Id. at 1137 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1138.
82. See infra Part VA (discussing the role of trade dress in helping consumers identify
otherwise hidden values).
83. McCarthy says of Romm Art "This is a unique result that seriously impinges on the
policy of copyright law that artistic style is no one's exclusive property." McCARTHY, supra
note 37, § 6.04[2], at 6-27 n.20. Curiously, as his use of "unique" indicates, McCarthy ex-
empts Hartford House from similar criticism. See id. Both cases, however, leap frog copy-
right by giving trade dress protection to visual styles. In similar fashion, McCarthy cites
Hanford House in his brief discussion under "'Hard Cases': Words That Are the Product,"
without citing Romm Art. Id § 7.26[7], at 7-151 n.143.
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B. Virtual Trade Dress in Services
The two trade dress cases that apply most directly to virtual envi-
ronments-Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R Others, Inc.84 and Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.85-involve claims to the design and decor of
restaurants. The reason for this seemingly odd coincidence becomes
clear on reflection: restaurants sell not just food but dining exper-
iences. They aim to offer their customers artificial environments hav-
ing both entertaining and useful features. Those that develop virtual
realities will no doubt aim at similar goals.
Virtual reality developers will also share with restaurant owners
the desire to wield intellectual property laws to foreclose effective
competition. Everybody, it seems, wants a monopoly. Not everyone
deserves one, though. Fuddruckers and Two Pesos create undeservedly
broad intellectual property rights. The plaintiffs in each of these cases
won virtual trade dress rights to their restaurant services, though in
contrast to Hartford House and Romm Art, this virtual trade dress came
mixed with the real thing. Had the Fuddruckers and Two Pesos courts
recognized the risks of granting virtual trade dress rights, they might
have tailored their remedies accordingly.
1. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc.-The plaintiff in
Fuddruckers alleged infringement of trade dress it had established in its
restaurants' decor and services.86 The claimed decor included large
condiment and appetizer bars, two-by-four white tiles, neon signs, mir-
rors, and director's chairs.8 7 The claimed services included making
food preparation and storage readily visible, offering a free restaurant
newspaper, and selling bones to customers for their dogs.8" Denied a
franchise, the defendants borrowed these and other elements of the
alleged trade dress for their rival restaurant, Doc's B.R. Others.89 Fud-
druckers sued for trade dress infringement, lost at trial, and ap-
pealed.90 The appellate court approached the problem largely as it
would have approached a trademark infringement claim, holding that
"trade dress may be protected if it is nonfunctional and has acquired
secondary meaning and if its imitation creates a likelihood of con-
84. 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987).
85. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
86. Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 841.
87. Id. at 839-40.
88. Id.
89. IM at 840.
90. Id. at 841.
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sumer confusion."9 1 Yet the Fuddruckers court could not ignore cer-
tain quirks unique to the case.
First, the nature of Fuddruckers's claim ensured that its trade
dress would include many unquestionably functional elements, such
as counters, cups, and lights.92 The court thus took pains to stress that
"functional elements that are separately unprotectable can be pro-
tected together as part of a trade dress.""3 Like the court in Hartford
House, the Fuddruckers court asked whether the elements created a dis-
tinctive impression when taken together as a whole9 4 and agreed that
a combination of elements can qualify for trade dress protection even
if the individual elements cannot.
9 5
The court in Fuddruckers also faced the question of whether one
who makes a trade dress claim can, like one making a trademark
claim, escape the burden of showing secondary meaning by establish-
ing that the intellectual property in question has inherently distinctive
qualities.96 The court complained that Fuddruckers "has not offered
this court a definition of what 'inherently distinctive' in the trademark
sense might mean in the absence of secondary meaning."9 7 Perhaps
to its relief, the Fuddruckers court found that it did not need to decide
whether trade dress could ever be inherently distinctive per se.98 Fi-
nal resolution of that question would have to wait for Two Pesos.
The Fuddruckers court overlooked the real oddity in the plaintiffs
trade dress claim: the claim included the very commodity that the
restaurant offered and sold to consumers.99 As Professor Gifford has
explained, the trade dress in Fuddruckers represents "not packaging,
but rather a constituent part of that which is being purchased. Restau-
rant customers buy more than the food; they buy ambience and at-
91. Id. at 842.
92. Id. at 839-40, 840 n.1.
93. l& (citing LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 842-43. Conversely, functional features may combine into a nonfunctional
whole. See Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir.
1988).
96. Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 843.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 844 ("Fuddruckers claims trade dress protection for the impression created
by a collection of common or functional elements of restaurant decor. Such an overall
impression may receive protection, but it is simply not the sort of arbitrary or uncommon
trade dress that might qualify as inherently distinctive.").
99. Id. at 839.
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mosphere. It is the latter over which Fuddruckers sought
protection."100
2. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.-As in Fuddruckers, Two
Pesos involved two restaurants wrestling over the rights to shared trade
dress. The plaintiff, Taco Cabana, claimed that the defendant, Two
Pesos, had copied its building's exterior, sign, kitchen floor plan, de-
cor, menu, serving equipment, uniforms, and other features reflecting
the restaurant's Mexican theme.' 0 Like the court in Fuddruckers, the
Two Pesos Court overlooked the particular problems raised by the vir-
tual trade dress at issue.
Unlike the court in Fuddruckers, the Court in Two Pesos addressed
whether the same tests for determining a trademark's inherent dis-
tinctiveness and secondary meaning also apply to trade dress."°2 The
Court held: "There is no persuasive reason to apply to trade dress a
general requirement of secondary meaning which is at odds with the
principles generally applicable to infringement suits under § 43 (a) [of
the Lanham Act]."'~ In broad terms, the Court found that section
43(a) "provides no basis for distinguishing between trademark and
trade dress."'0 4 For better or worse, Two Pesos signaled that the
Supreme Court will probably treat trade dress as it does any other
form of intellectual property covered by the Lanham Act.
The Supreme Court in Two Pesos neglected, however, to prepare
courts for this brave new world of federal trade dress law. It provided
no standard for detecting inherent distinctiveness in trade dress, °5
nor did it criticize the trial court's clearly erroneous finding that the
plaintiff's trade dress qualified as distinctive.) ° As a later court noted
of the trade dress protected by Two Pesos, "the product itself is the room
and its furnishings as well as whatever food is served." 0 7 Such trade
dress should not slip past the test for inherent distinctiveness, because
100. Gifford, supra note 6, at 789; see also Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 134 (8th
Cir. 1986) (denying trade dress protection to a restaurant on the grounds that "consumer
demand for the concept of 'down home country cooking' includes the demand for the
trade dress that creates the concept").
101. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992).
102. Id. at 774.
103. Id. at 770.
104. Id. at 773.
105. The Court declined to consider whether the plaintiffs trade dress in fact qualified
as distinctive. Id. at 770. On a related note, the Court also declined to address the ques-
tion of functionality. Id. at 767 n.6.
106. The trial court had somewhat unhelpfully instructed the jury that "to be found
inherently distinctive, the trade dress must not be descriptive." Id. at 766 n.3.
107. Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995) (emphasis
added).
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trade dress that constitutes part of a commodity cannot fail to describe
it108
C. Contra Virtual Trade Dress: Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic
Enterprises, Ltd.
Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd.a 9 represents the
most thoroughly reasoned, and almost the only, case in which a court
has refused to grant trade dress protection on the grounds that it rep-
resents the very commodity that consumers value. ° The plaintiff in
Duraco manufactured and sold plastic planters resembling Grecian
stone urns.111 Plaintiff brought suit under section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act' 12 against parties that made and marketed planters of similar
shape, appearance, and texture.' 13 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit affirmed, on different grounds, the trial
court's refusal to grant the plaintiff a preliminary injunction.' 14
The Third Circuit's reasoning followed a number of interesting
and insightful steps. The court launched its discussion with a distinc-
tion that would, however, prove controversial. The court claimed that
the case concerned "trade dress said to inhere in the product itself,
rather than trade dress alleged in a product's packaging."" 5 It
termed the former type of trade dress "product configuration," the
latter type "product packaging," and explained that "the legal doc-
trines in these two very different situations will substantially
diverge."116
This distinction allowed the court to avoid the reach of Two Pesos,
a case in which the Duraco court found no guidance on how to treat
product configuration.1 17 The court in Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad
Corp.118 criticized this maneuver, observing that "[w]e, however, read
Two Pesos as resting on a presumption that 'trade dress' is a single
108. See Gleiberman, supra note 6, at 2043 ("When the mark being protected is the con-
figuration of the product itself, to say that the design feature is not descriptive of the prod-
uct is simply inaccurate in the large majority of cases.") (footnote omitted).
109. 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
110. Id. at 1453-54; see also Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 134 (8th Cir.
1986) (denying trade dress protection on grounds that "consumer demand.., includes
the demand for the trade dress that creates the concept").
111. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1434.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
113. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1433.
114. Id. at 1433-34.
115. Id. at 1439.
116. Id
117. Id. at 1440.
118. 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995).
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concept that encompasses both product configuration and packag-
ing."119 This criticism gives too little credit to the finesse with which
the Duraco court sidestepped Two Pesos.2 ' The Duraco court in fact
argued that Two Pesos did not decide whether trade dress-particularly
trade dress in a product configuration-can ever actually qualify as
inherently distinctive.12 Rather, "for purposes of that case, the Court
assumed that the restaurant decor at issue was ... inherently distinc-
tive. " "' Justified or not, the distinction made by the Third Circuit in
Duraco freed it to approach the problem of virtual trade dress from a
new, and ultimately better, angle.
The Duraco court next criticized the plaintiff's routine application
of the generic-descriptive-suggestive-arbitrary-or-fanciful scale of as-
cending distinctiveness first set forth in Abercrombie &Fitch Co. v. Hunt-
ing World, Inc.,' and afterward applied indiscriminately to trademark
and trade dress cases alike.' 24 The Third Circuit's exceptional state-
ment of the issue bears quoting at length:
[W] e do not think it helpful or proper to transplant the cate-
gorical distinctiveness inquiry developed for trademarks to
product configurations, where the alleged trade dress lies in
the very product itself.... [A] product configuration differs
fundamentally from a product's trademark, insofar as it is
not a symbol according to which one can relate the signifier
(the trademark, or perhaps the packaging) to the signified
(the product). Being constitutive of the product itself and
thus having no such dialectical relationship to the product,
the product's configuration cannot be said to be "suggestive"
or "descriptive" of the product, or "arbitrary" or "fanciful" in
relation to it. The very basis for the trademark taxonomy---the
descriptive relationship between the mark and the product,
along with the degree to which the mark describes the prod-
uct-is unsuited for application to the product itself 125
The Duraco court continued with the observation that trade dress
qua product befuddles attempts to discern whether consumers buy a
product because of the goodwill associated with its trade dress or sim-
119. Id. at 787.
120. Note, however, that the Duraco court probably did err insofar as it relied on the
claim that "Two Pesos dealt with a restaurant's decor, more akin to product packaging than
product configuration." Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1442.
121. Id. at 1440.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
124. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303 (1995) (applying
the Abercrombie scale to pure color).
125. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1440-41 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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ply because they like its trade dress. 126 Courts should thus not assume
that a unique product configuration, which they might mistakenly re-
gard as "distinctive" in the trademark sense, necessarily identifies the
product's source. To make that mistake may well result in a world in
which, thanks to courts having created virtual trade dress rights, con-
sumers assume that a product's features identify the product's source.
That merely signifies the circularity of the problem. As the Duraco
court explained: "[A] ny perceptible product feature or combination
or arrangement of features can distinguish goods, and perhaps is
likely to do so if, as a rule, nobody else were allowed to copy it."127
Such an unseemly result would by no means excuse creating trade
dress rights in product configurations.
Despite its skepticism about trade dress claims to product con-
figurations, the Duraco court did not rule them out entirely. Indeed, it
read Two Pesos to require recognition of some such claims. 128 The
Third Circuit conditioned its acceptance, however, on the following
test: "IT]o be inherently distinctive, a product configuration . . . for
which Lanham Act protection is sought must be (i) unusual and mem-
orable; (ii) conceptually separable from the product; and (iii) likely to
serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product.""2 In apply-
ing this test to the product configuration before it, the court noted
that neither the product's success nor the defendant's intentional
copying established secondary meaning;3 0 rather, both could have re-
sulted merely from the intrinsic value of the trade dress in question.1 3 '
As this review indicates, Duraco provides a probing and far-reach-
ing examination of the problems presented by trade dress that itself
constitutes what consumers value. The opinion offers promising solu-
tions to those problems. There are two limitations on the court's
otherwise comprehensive treatment, however. First, Duraco expressly
declined to address the difficult question of how to evaluate the func-
tionality of trade dress that itself constitutes a consumer's desidera-
tuM.1 2 Not having the court's freedom to resolve the virtual trade
dress problem on other grounds, this Article will address the problem
of functionality below.' 3
126. Id. at 1441.
127. Id. at 1447 (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 1446 (reading Two Pesos "as giving an imprimatur to finding trade dress in a
product configuration to be inherently distinctive under certain narrow circumstances").
129. Id. at 1448-49.
130. Id. at 1452-53.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1434.
133. See infra Part VI.B.2.
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Second, although Duraco concerned trade dress having per se
value, that trade dress mingled with a product having independent
value.1 1 4 Had the court metaphorically peeled the trade dress off the
urns in question, a product having some residual value-an ordinary
plastic planter, for example-would have remained. The trade dress
in Hartford House, Romm Art, and more pointedly in hypothetical cases
from virtual environments, examined below, differs in a crucial re-
gard: it comes unattached to any independently valuable product.
Peeling away such purely virtual trade dress leaves behind absolutely
nothing of value. This consideration renders much of the Duraco
court's test of inherent distinctiveness irrelevant, as pure virtual trade
dress should never merit protection as an indicator of source.
IV. WHY PROTECT TRADE DREss?
The justifications for protecting trade dress, as distinct from
trademark, have not received much scholarly attention. Arguments in
defense of trademarks fit trade dress quite well, and would have done
so even if Two Pesos had not essentially equated the two areas of law.135
Trade dress and trademarks share common roots and serve common
ends. Section A argues that trademark law has as its fundamental goal
revealing otherwise hidden information about the quality of goods
and services. Section B explains why free riders threaten this informa-
tive function and how granting property rights to marks that identify
commodities inhibits free riding. Section C concludes that these same
arguments hold true in virtual environments.
A. Revealing Hidden Qualities
To put the matter in fundamental terms, trademark law aims at
providing information about the otherwise hidden qualities of partic-
ular goods or services.13 6 Economists classify goods with hidden quali-
ties as "experience" goods or "credence" goods. 13 7 Experience goods
134. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1437.
135. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992) ("There is no
textual basis for applying different analysis to [trademarks and trade dress].").
136. See Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK RFP. 523,
525-26 (1988); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Per-
spective, 30J.L. & ECON. 265, 275 (1987).
137. See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud,
16J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973) (referring to characteristics of a purchase as "experience"
qualities when they "can be discovered only after purchase as the product is used," and as
"credence" qualities, which cannot be determined even in normal use after purchase). A
third category of goods, "search" goods, possesses qualities that consumers can detect prior
to purchase. See Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311,
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(and, by extension, services) possess qualities that consumers can de-
tect only after purchase. Examples of experience commodities in-
clude boxed products, medicine, and new employees. Credence
goods and services, in contrast, possess qualities that might never be-
come apparent. Consumers purchase these based on authoritative ad-
vice. Examples of credence commodities include vitamins, legal
advice, and a good education.1 3 8
At least with regard to experience commodities, protectable
marks and trade dress help consumers to perceive immediately quali-
ties that would otherwise remain hidden until after purchase.1 3 9
Trademarks reduce consumers' search costs by making it easier for
them to identify goods.14 ° This, in turn, encourages producers that
hold trademarks to invest in the quality of their products because they
can develop valuable goodwill by maintaining consistent quality over
time and across consumers.' Both of these effects-reducing con-
sumers' search costs and encouraging producers' consistency -stem
from the fundamental purpose of trademark law: to reveal informa-
tion about the hidden qualities of goods and services. 14 2
312 (1970) (defining "search" as any way of evaluating price or quality options open to the
consumer, when the consumer inspects the option prior to purchasing the brand). Even
here, trademarks and trade dress can help to lower information costs. The present discus-
sion, however, primarily concerns a subclass of search goods for which information costs
approach zero: inspection goods.
138. See Wiuam M. LANDES & RicHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF TORT
LAw 284-85 (1987); Darby & Karni, supra note 137, at 68-69; Nelson, supra note 137, at 321-
23.
139. Trademarks help define credence goods only indirectly and only insofar as they get
packaged as experience goods. Suppose an authority reports that vitamin E extends life
span, making it a credence good, and a manufacturer puts vitamin E capsules in opaque
bottles. The manufacturer's trademark on the opaque bottles identifies not vitamin E per
se, but rather only its capsules, which qualify as experience goods relative to other manu-
facturers' capsules.
140. See Landes & Posner, supra note 136, at 268-69, 275.
141. See id. at 269.
142. It bears noting that this function has nothing to do with encouraging innovation,
fundamentally distinguishing trademark law from patent and copyright law. Courts have
sometimes overlooked this distinction. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653
F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981) (criticizing the aesthetic functionality doctrine on the
grounds that it discourages imaginative and attractive marks); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hall-
mark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1540 (D. Colo. 1986) ("One salutary purpose of the
Lanham Act... is to protect a creative artists' [sic] rights in his or her creation and thus
provide incentive to be creative."), affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988). The court in
Duraco Products, Inc. v.Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1441, 1446 (3d Cir. 1994), among
others, recognized the fault in such views. See supra Part III.C; see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacob-
son Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995) ("It is the province of patent law, not trade-
mark law, to encourage invention- . ."); Gleiberman, supra note 6, at 2056-57 (noting that
trademark law is not designed to encourage creativity in product design).
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Trademarks thus add no value to goods that have no hidden qual-
ities.' 43 Consumers can perceive the qualities of such "inspection
goods" immediately, before paying anything more to consume
them. 44 Examples of inspection goods include nonoccasion greeting
cards, paintings, and screen savers. A similar analysis applies to in-
spection services; a simple street performance, for example, wears its
value on its face. Certain contexts can, of course, obscure the other-
wise apparent value of inspection commodities. A retailer ordering
cards in bulk may thus benefit from reference to the "Blue Mountain"
mark. Consumers browsing through a card rack, however, will find
the same mark useless. 14 5 They need only inspect a card to determine
its worth.
This same analysis applies to trade dress. In its usual, proper role,
trade dress informs consumers about the hidden qualities of goods
and services. Trade dress runs the peculiar risk, however, of constitut-
ing the very commodity that consumers value and, thus, becoming
virtual trade dress. Virtual trade dress can do nothing to inform con-
sumers of its own hidden qualities. The proof of its value, like that of
the proverbial pudding, is in its consumption. Virtual trade dress thus
cannot serve the primary goal of trademark law: to inform consumers
about the hidden qualities of goods and services.'
46
143. To speak more comprehensively, trademarks add less value to goods that have fewer
hidden qualities. This pragmatic hedge accommodates an argument that Dan L. Burk
made when commenting on an earlier draft of this Article: Every commodity has some
hidden qualities; inspection, experience, and credence goods thus differ only in how rap-
idly consumers can assess them. Even granting Burk's argument, however, it remains true
that the costs of protecting trademarks in inspection goods almost always outweigh the
benefits.
144. SeeLANDES & POSNER, supra note 138, at 284. Landes and Posner equate inspection
goods with search goods generally, commenting that in the nineteenth century, a con-
sumer could detect the qualities of such goods at low cost. See id They correctly note,
however, that now some search goods reveal their qualities only at high cost (albeit prior to
purchase). See id. at 285 (explaining that "[t]he growth in the technical complexity of
products" and consumers' lack of technical knowledge has increased search costs); see also
Nelson, supra note 137, at 312 (noting that if search procedures are too costly, consumers
might employ experience procedures). The present text thus reserves "inspection" for
goods that reveal their qualities at little or no cost, prior to purchase.
145. Why, then, does Hallmark advertise the significance of its mark? To draw consum-
ers to its racks and to suggest slyly that recipients can use its mark as a proxy for the
senders' expenses.
146. This analysis suggests an interesting way to regard the purpose of trademarks, ser-
vice marks, and, by extension, trade dress: by revealing hidden qualities, they aim at mak-
ing all goods more functionally equivalent to inspection goods.
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B. Preventing Free Riders from Copying
Competitors have a powerful incentive to copy the trademarks
that identify successful goods and services. Landes and Posner ex-
plain that "[t]he free-riding competitor will, at little cost, capture
some of the profits associated with a strong trademark because some
consumers will assume (at least in the short run) that the free rider's
and the original trademark holder's brands are identical."' 47 A trag-
edy of the commons thus threatens trademark law. If not prevented,
free riding will corrupt the information about hidden qualities that
trademarks send to consumers. Unable to trust trademarks, consum-
ers will ignore them. With no way to convince consumers about the
hidden quality of their commodities, producers will let that quality
fall.
As with other problems arising out of common ownership, as-
signing property rights to the contested resource provides a workable
solution. In this commons problem, trademarks represent the con-
tested resource, and property rights thereto provide their holders with
the power to bar other parties from using the marks in manners likely
to confuse consumers. This property right could theoretically vest in
consumers themselves, who would bring class action misrepresenta-
tion claims against infringing parties.' 48 Such a scheme would give
rise to large administrative costs, however. 149 In practice, therefore,
trademark rights vest in those who create the products to which the
trademarks attach.
C. Copying in Virtual Reality
Free riding would pose no risk to intellectual property rights if
the inherent costs of copying always outran the benefits. In the real
world, however, copying intellectual property almost always costs rela-
tively less than creating it from scratch.'I" This holds as true for trade-
marks and trade dress as it does for copyrights and patents. In each
case, therefore, the law tries to make up the difference by imposing
additional costs for unauthorized copying.'
147. Landes & Posner, supra note 136, at 270.
148. Despite the broad language of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994), allowing "any person
who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by" violation of its terms, courts are
divided on whether to give consumers standing to sue. Compare Colligan v. Activities Club,
442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971) (standing denied), with Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Org., Inc.,
333 F. Supp. 116 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (standing allowed).
149. See Colligan, 442 F.2d at 693.
150. Copying can prove quite expensive in absolute terms. Consider for example, the
costs of copying a restaurant's architecture, decor, and service.
151. See Landes & Posner, supra note 136, at 270.
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As in real space, it will usually prove cheaper to copy a computer
interface or virtual environment than to produce a competing one
from scratch. Copying a marketable setting, be it real or virtual, al-
ways avoids the costs of creative design. If accomplished by duplicat-
ing the relevant software, copying a virtual setting would in addition
avoid "construction" costs. Technical devices such as encryption, and
legal doctrines such as copyright, patent, or trade secret law, would
presumably protect the software itself from duplication. Copyright
law-and to some extent trade dress law-would protect the output of
that software. These considerations merely go to show that nothing
about computerization automatically cures the problems that have al-
ways plagued intellectual property. To the contrary, valid trade dress
continues to require legal protection, while virtual trade dress contin-
ues to require legal censure.
V. WHY NOT PROTECT VIRTUAL TRADE DREss?
A. The Economic Case Against Virtual Trade Dress
Virtual trade dress does not fare well under a cost/benefit analy-
sis. Rather than adding value to an associated commodity, it is the
very good or service that consumers desire. It thus does little or noth-
ing to lower the cost of identifying a commodity's source or affiliation.
On the other hand, protecting virtual trade dress has a considerable
downside cost.
As an immediately perceptible desideratum, virtual trade dress rep-
resents an inspection commodity. Lacking residual hidden value,
such a good or service gains little from affiliation with a trademark or
trade dress. Consumers can identify the qualities of an inspection
commodity without further purchase and can thus choose whether to
consume it without the help of marks indicating hidden qualities.152
To the extent, if any, that virtual trade dress identifies a product's
source, it does so needlessly.
Granting rights to virtual trade dress threatens to create, in effect,
a new intellectual property regime protecting product designs as well
as the design of services. Those who have called for legislative protec-
tion of product design argue that it would efficiently reward innova-
tion.153 That Congress has consistently refused such entreaties says at
152. See supra Part WA. This analysis leaves room for traditional trademarks or trade
dress to operate prior to consumption-a point at which virtual trade dress by definition
cannot operate.
153. See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REX'. 887, 949-62 (proposing that the doctrine of distinctiveness offers the flexibility re-
quired for industrial design innovation); Gifford, supra note 6, at 791-92 ("[That] a trade-
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least something about the merits of those arguments." Beyond the
concern that courts have evaded congressional intent by creating
rights to virtual trade dress, it seems unlikely that virtual trade dress
would protect product design efficiently. The potentially limitless life
span of virtual trade dress strikes a poor balance-or, rather, no bal-
ance-between encouraging innovation in product designs and open-
ing them to public access.155
Even apart from the legal and policy arguments against creating
rights to virtual trade dress, defending rights to virtual trade dress
would give rise to large transaction costs. Claimants typically find it
difficult to capture their diffuse trade dress in a description suffi-
ciently concrete to qualify for registration. 5 ' Thanks to the broad
reach of section 43(a), however, claimants find registration largely un-
necessary. 57 Not being registerable or registered, virtual trade dress
usually will remain hidden from parties that search the prior art in an
effort to avoid liability for infringement. Those parties will no doubt
rue the fact that section 43(a) does not excuse innocent
infringement.15
Because virtual trade dress has such vague boundaries, the exact
scope of claims to it will resist definition. This will make it hard to
assign value to infringement claims and, thus, to settle litigation. 59
The diffuse nature of virtual trade dress and the difficulty in resolving
infringement claims will more than deter parties that consider adopt-
ing new trade dress. Far from encouraging innovation in product de-
sign, virtual trade dress thus threatens to have a net effect of stifling it.
mark conveys information about the product itself... is especially important in stimulating
new product variations .. ").
154. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v.Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1446 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[D]esign protection laws (which have repeatedly been introduced in Congress during
virtually every session since 1917) have not once been enacted."); see also Brown, supra note
6, at 1395-96 (outlining Congress's sporadic attempts to enact design protection statutes
since 1914); Gleiberman, supra note 6, at 2070 (noting that industrial design bills have not
been enacted by Congress).
155. In response to the claim that trade dress rights prohibit much less than copyright
or patent law, see infra Part VI.C.
156. See supra Part II.
157. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
159. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study ofSetlement Negotia-
tions and the Selection of Cases for Tia4 90 MicH. L. REv. 319, 322, 373 (1991) (arguing that
strategic bargaining is a strong determinant in the ability to settle cases); George L. Priest,
Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 533 (1989) (offering a
general formulation allowing for consideration of strategic litigation); George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesforLitigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (arguing
that economics are the only determinants of settlement and litigation, "including the ex-
pected costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions").
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B. The Legal Case Against Virtual Trade Dress
1. Distinctiveness.-Courts traditionally classify marks and trade
dress on the Abercrombie scale of distinctiveness, which ascends
through generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful levels of
distinctiveness.1 6 ° To win legal protection from copying, a mark or
trade dress must either possess inherent distinctiveness (by qualifying
as suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful) or acquire it through secondary
meaning (by showing long and effective use of the descriptive ele-
ment).61 As the Duraco court noted, this taxonomy fits product con-
figurations awkwardly.162 Nonetheless, inquiry into the fundamentals
of the Abercrombie scale shows that it disqualifies virtual trade dress as
inherently nondistinctive. As the very product that consumers value,
virtual trade dress cannot help but remain indistinct from that
product. 163
At root, the Abercrombie scale measures the metaphorical distance
between the "sense" of a mark or trade dress and its "reference." The
sense of a symbol lies somewhere between the wholly subjective im-
pressions that it arouses in each observer and the objective, external
thing to which it refers.164 Thus, "morning star" has a different sense
from "evening star" even though both names refer to the same object:
Venus.165 This abstract notion casts new light on the Abercrombie scale.
A fanciful mark, like KODAK, makes no sense as a word standing
alone.166 It functions solely to refer to KODAK goods and services.
This demonstrates that with fanciful marks the distance between sense
160. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
161. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (holding that
secondary meaning is not necessary if trade dress is inherently distinctive).
162. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1434 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[A] product configuration ... is not a symbol according to which one can relate the
signifier (the trademark, or perhaps the packaging) to the signified (the product).").
163. See id. at 1452; Brown, supra note 6, at 1380 (arguing that a distinctive design does
not automatically imply a secondary meaning); see also Drater, supra note 153, at 903 (not-
ing that the requirement of most courts that there be a showing of distinctiveness for trade
dress would also apply to industrial designs).
164. See Gottiob Frege, On Sense and Meaning (M. Black trans.), reprinted in COLLECTED
PAPERS ON MATHEMATICS, LOGIC, AND PHILOSOPHY 157, 160 (Brian McGuinness ed., 1984).
165. See id. at 162; see alSOJOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC RATIOCINATIVE AND
INDUCTIVE, reprinted in VII COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 34 (J.M. Robson ed.,
1973) ("[W]henever the names given to objects convey any information, that is, whenever
they have properly any meaning, the meaning resides not in what they denote, but in what
they connote. The only names of objects which connote nothing are proper names; and
these have, strictly speaking, no signification.").
166. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (enjoining a
street performer from using the name "Kodak" as a stage name or for any other commer-
cial purpose).
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and reference reaches from nothing at all to something concrete-a
maximum level of distinctiveness. An arbitrary mark like NOVA, in
contrast, has some sense (a stellar explosion) independent of its refer-
ent (a particular television program). 67 NOVA still does not refer to
a competing commodity, however. With regard to arbitrary marks,
sense and reference approach each other but stay far enough apart to
make such marks inherently distinctive.
Sense and reference draw still nearer in a suggestive mark, such
as HABITAT, because it has a sense (living space) that hints at its
referent commodity (home furnishings)'68 A descriptive mark like
COCO-QUININE paints its referent (a combination of chocolate and
quinine) in bald terms, bringing sense and reference quite close to-
gether. 169 A generic word, such as CEREAL, can never win trademark
protection because its sense (cereal) comes as close to its referent (ce-
real) as a word can get to a thing.
Virtual trade dress carries this trend to its logical extreme, merg-
ing sense and reference completely. As the very product that consumers
value, virtual trade dress signifies itself. To the extent that it has any
sense as a signal of value, it points only at the value found within its
own scope. The court in Duraco thus erred when, in grudgingly trying
to fit virtual trade dress on the Abercrombie scale, it said that "one could
at best say that a product configuration is descriptive of (because iden-
tical with) the product itself."' 70 As the above analysis demonstrates,
trade dress constituting a product does not describe the product, nor
does it qualify as generic of the product; rather, it merges sense and
reference to become the product.
2. Functionality.-Judicial interpretation of the Lanham Act has
established conclusively that the Act grants no protection to "func-
tional" goods or services,' 7' even though the Act itself nowhere de-
fines the term. Courts have interpreted the term "functional" in a
167. See WGBH Educ. Found., Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 453 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (enjoining Penthouse International from publishing a proposed Nova magazine),
affd without op., 598 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1979).
168. See Habitat Design Holdings Ltd. v. Habitat, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(enjoining Habitat England from operating in any location where it would infringe on
Habitat, Inc.'s trademark), modified, 573 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1978).
169. See William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924) (recognizing the
use of a similar name by a competitor, even if the public will mistake the origin or owner-
ship of the product, so long as the product is clearly labeled).
170. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1441 (3d Cir. 1994).
171. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1301 (1995) (noting that
this doctrine is one of the "underlying principles of trademark law").
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variety of ways.' 72 The same court will sometimes even advance sev-
eral definitions together with the admonition that none applies in a
mechanical fashion.17 Virtual trade dress violates any of these various
tests of functionality, however, as well as the fundamental policy that
unifies them.
The Supreme Court recently explained that a mark or trade dress
will qualify as functional "'if it is essential to the use or purpose of the
article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article,' that is, if exclu-
sive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant
nonreputation-related disadvantage."' 74 This definition of functional
was previously applied at trial, 75 and affirmed on appeal,' 76 in Hart-
ford House. The test's general use thus invites the same analysis that
applied above to its particular use in Hartford House. 77
To apply this test of functionality properly, however, a court must
define the relevant market narrowly. In the case of virtual trade dress,
the court must recognize that trade dress itself constitutes the product
at issue, the desideratum of the relevant market. 7 s As such, the trade
dress "'is essential to the use or purpose of the article"' and its exclu-
sive use "would put competitors at a significant nonreputation-related
disadvantage."' 79  Therefore, virtual trade dress qualifies as
functional.
Despite quoting this particular test, the Court in Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co. 8 ° did not rule out using other tests of functional-
ity.181 It implicitly endorsed the "primary value" test.182 The court in
172. McCarthy wryly observed, "It seems that there are as many definitions of what is
'functional' as there are courts." McCARTHY, supra note 37, § 7.26[3] [a], at 7-122.
173. See, e.g., United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028,
1033-34 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he essence of the question is whether a particular feature...
is part of the 'function' served, or whether the primary value.., is the identification of the
provider.").
174. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304 (quoting Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 850 n.10 (1982)); see also Interactive Network, Inc. v. NTN Communications, Inc., 875
F. Supp. 1398, 1407 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (applying the same test to find a software user inter-
face to be functional).
175. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1537 (D. Colo.
1986) (quoting Inwood Lab., 456 U.S. at 850 n.10).
176. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1988)
("'Although the determination of functional... may be difficult, the decision should neverthe-
less rest on whether alternative appealing designs or presentations of the product can be developed.'"
(quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987))).
177. See supra Part IVA.I.a.
178. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304 (quoting Inwood Lab., 456 U.S. at 850 n.10).
179. Id.
180. 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
181. Id. at 1304-05.
182. Id. at 1303.
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Hartford House misapplied this test, but recited it correctly: "A non-
functional feature is one whose prmary value is to identify the source of
the particular goods or services."1 3 Although the Supreme Court in
Qualitex did not explicitly adopt this test, it approved registration of
the mark in question-a green-gold color-with the observation that
it "serves no other function" than to identify its source.'8 4 The Qual-
itex Court further observed that, in general, color "can act as a symbol
that distinguishes a firm's goods and identifies their source, without
serving any other significant function." ' 5 This test of functionality
plainly bars virtual trade dress, which primarily serves not to identify
source, but rather to embody the very commodity that consumers
value.
A more powerful version of the "primary purpose" test appears
especially well suited to detecting virtual trade dress. This test, popu-
lar in the Third Circuit, frames the issue in negative terms: "'Proof of
nonfunctionality generally requires a showing that the element of the
product serves no purpose other than identification.""86 This test works,
however, only if the party claiming rights to a mark or trade dress
bears the burden of proving it nonfunctional. It will thus not apply
universally, as circuits have split on the question of who bears the bur-
den of proving functionality.'8 7 Moreover, the Third Circuit, which
183. Hartford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1541 (emphasis added) (citing United States Golf
Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1984)). Although the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's functionality analysis in general, and in particular
so far as that analysis relied on the "available alternatives" test, it did not comment on the
trial court's (mis)use of the "primary value" test. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1273; see also
US. Golf 749 F.2d at 1033 (stating that the question of the functionality of a feature is
determined by asking "whether a particular feature of a product or service is substantially
related to its value as a product or service... or whether the primary value of a particular
feature is the identification of the provider").
184. Qualitex 115 S. Ct. at 1305. The Court observed: "[The color in question] identi-
fies the press pads' source. And, the green-gold color serves no other function." Id.
185. Id. at 1304 (citations omitted).
186. Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir.
1992) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharm. Lab., Inc.,
625 F.2d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1980)).
187. Compare Merchant &Evans, 963 F.2d at 633 (holding that a party asserting infringe-
ment bears the burden of proving nonfunctionality), and Woodsmith Publ'g Co. v. Mere-
dith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir. 1990) (same), and Rachel v. Banana Republic,
Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir. 1987) (same), with Computer Care v. Service Sys. En-
ters., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a party seeking to invalidate a
mark must prove functionality), and Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846
F.2d 1268, 1271 n.3 (10th Cir. 1988) (same), and LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d
71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985) (same). See also Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc.,
626 F.2d 193, 195-96 (lst Cir. 1980) (stating in dicta that the trial court did not err in
placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff; record rendered issue moot). The Federal
Circuit has staked out an intermediary position. See Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l
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has been distinguished for applying so narrow a test,18  has not em-
ployed it to the exclusion of less restrictive tests.18 9
Despite their various formulations, all functionality tests aim at
the same fundamental policy goal: balancing monopoly rights against
public access. As the Supreme Court explained in Qualitex. "The
functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to pro-
mote competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead in-
hibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a
useful product feature." 190 Typical of such discussions, however, the
Court went on to express concern solely about the impact of func-
tional marks on patent law, ignoring the conflict with copyright: "It is
the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention
.... If a product's functional features could be used as trademarks,
however, a monopoly over such features could be obtained without
regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended for-
ever .. 19t
However well intentioned the Court's concern, it appears, on re-
flection, strangely parsimonious. Utility patents no doubt aim to en-
Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that a party seeking protec-
tion has the burden of proving nonfunctionality, but only after opponent makes prima
facie case for functionality). The Eleventh Circuit has expressly declined to resolve who
bears the burden of proving functionality. SeeJohn H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,
711 F.2d 966, 982 n.26 (lth Cir. 1983) (finding that the issue was not reserved for ap-
peal). Thus far, the Supreme Court has done little more about this split than to observe, in
a concurrence, that "functionality is a defense to a suit under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act."
Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) (White, J., concurring).
Questions about the burden of proving functionality properly arise only with regard to
unregistered trade dress, of course, as registered marks enjoy a presumption of validity. See
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1994); see also Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 869
(8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the presumption of validity is rebuttable). Note, however,
that many trade dress claims prove difficult to register. See supra Part II.
188. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 1984)
("[M]any designs and features have both functional and identifying aspects .... Thus,
protection may be accorded a distinctive or identifying design, even though that design is
also related to function.").
189. For example, the Third Circuit, in Merchant & Evans, also cited the popular test of
functionality set forth in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850
n.10 (1982). Merchant &Evans, 963 F.2d at 633.
190. Qualitex 115 S. Ct. at 1304; see also RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 17 (1995) ("The rule excluding functional designs from the subject matter of trademark
law is an attempt to identify situations in which the public and private interest in avoiding
confusion is outweighed by the anticompetitive consequences of trademark protection.");
McCARTHY, supra note 37, § 7.26[1], at 7-118 to -119 ("[Tihe 'right to compete' is the
ultimate policy goal of the functionality doctrine . . ").
191. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304; see also McCARTHY, supra note 37, § 7.26[1], at 7-116
("Thus, the primary rationale behind the public policy requirement of non-functionality is
the need to accommodate trademark and unfair competition law with utility patent law
" (emphasis added)).
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courage innovation by granting limited monopolies in functional
inventions. Does not copyright law also aim to encourage creativity?
Congress has power to legislate in each area under the grace of the
same constitutional provision: Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.192 This
provision specifies that both patents and copyrights shall persist "for
limited Times."193 Surely, no one doubts that both utility patents and
copyrights constitute valuable monopolies and that competitors with-
out such monopolies suffer considerable disadvantages. It seems rea-
sonable to conclude that if courts bar trade dress claims that would
interfere with Congress's carefully balanced scheme of utility patent
rights, they ought likewise to bar trade dress claims that interfere with
copyright law.1 94 The same holds true of trade dress claims that inter-
fere with the law of design patents because it, no less than the law of
utility patents and copyright law, derives from the Constitution's Intel-
lectual Property Clause.195
This plea for equal treatment will not get far if it turns out that
trade dress simply cannot interfere with copyrights and design patents
in the way that it interferes with utility patents. The next section will
show that it can. For the present purpose of measuring virtual trade
dress against the fundamental test of functionality, it suffices to ob-
serve that virtual trade dress allows one competitor among many to
seize a potentially eternal monopoly on subject matter more properly
covered by the Intellectual Property Clause.
Suppose, for example, that a court gave one publisher an immor-
tal copyright, or one manufacturer an immortal design patent, while
limiting competitors to conventional limited rights. Would we not say,
in each case, that the court was "inhibiting legitimate competition"?' 9 6
Virtual trade dress has a similar effect. With regard to goods and serv-
ices that resemble real trade dress enough to fall under its aegis, vir-
tual trade dress offers a potentially eternal right to market the very
commodity that consumers value. It thus upsets the balance that legis-
lators have struck between encouraging innovation and freeing access
to ideas. In sum, virtual trade dress violates the policy at the heart of
the functionality doctrine.
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that Congress shall have the power "To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries" (emphasis
added)).
193. Id.
194. See infra Part VI.C.
195. See infra Part VI.C.
196. Qualitex 115 S. Ct. at 1304.
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C. The Policy Case Against Virtual Trade Dress
Virtual trade dress threatens the coherency of federal intellectual
property policy because it transgresses the established boundaries and
usurps the traditional roles of trademark, copyright, and patent law.
Such an impact certainly renders virtual trade dress unwelcome. It
may, furthermore, render it unconstitutional. This provides yet an-
other reason, in addition to those arising out of its violation of trade-
mark law proper,197 for questioning the propriety of virtual trade
dress.
Though they contain damning dicta, the familiar Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 98 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,"9 and Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.2"' line of cases does not directly
address the constitutionality of trade dress qua desideratum. Those
cases relied on the Constitution's Supremacy Clause20 1 to overturn
state laws that interfered with federal intellectual property policy.
202
Virtual trade dress, in contrast, risks unconstitutionality on far less fa-
miliar grounds: its grant of potentially eternal rights in intrinsically
valuable intellectual property may violate the limits set forth in the
Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause.203 These constitutional
questions will remain moot, however, if virtual trade dress does not
grant rights that conflict with those offered by the copyrights or de-
sign patents. Whether it does so poses a nice question, addressed
forthwith.
1. Virtual Trade Dress vs. Copyright Law.-Consider first the po-
tential conflict between virtual trade dress and copyrights. Federal law
bars the unauthorized duplication of trade dress only if it confuses
consumers, misrepresents a commodity, or dilutes a mark, 0 4 whereas
it bars the unauthorized duplication of copyrighted material in a wide
variety of contexts, confusing, misrepresentative, or otherwise. 20 5
Considering the "substantial similarity" standard for a showing of
197. See infra Part VI.B.
198. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
199. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
200. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
201. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that "the Laws of the United States... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby").
202. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 168; Compco, 376 U.S. at 237; Seas, 376 U.S. at 231.
203. See supra note 192.
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (providing for liability for confusing use of registered
designation of source); id. § 1125 (providing for liability for unfair use of unregistered
designation of source).
205. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (giving the owner of the copyright in a work the exclu-
sive right to reproduce, prepare derivative works based on, distribute copies of, perform, or
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copyright infringement to be broader than the "confusing similarity"
required for trademark claims, courts have refused to consider trade-
mark claims to material for which copyright claims have already
failed.2" 6 This suggests that trademarks generally provide rights nar-
rower in scope than copyrights and, therefore, that immortal trade
dress rights would not unconstitutionally broaden the congressional
power enumerated in the Intellectual Property Clause.
Nonetheless, a trademark generally does not cover the same sub-
ject matter as a copyright. The more it nears doing so, the more it
risks overextending the effective life of the associated copyright. Con-
sider Hartford House, in which granting trade dress rights in subject
matter more appropriately covered by copyright gave rise to an in-
fringement claim reaching beyond substantially similar copies.20 7
Thanks to the virtual trade dress at work, Hartford House contradicts
the general rule that the absence of an infringement claim under
copyright law will bar an infringement claim under trademark law. 0 8
In re DC Comics, Inc.,2 °9 in which the trademark in question correlated
exactly to the copyrighted image of Superman,210 likewise proves in-
structive. Judge Nies, specially concurring, questioned "whether the
quid pro quo for the protection granted under the copyright statute
has been given, if, upon expiration of the copyright, the design can-
publicly display the work); id. § 107 (providing fair use exception to copyright owner's
rights).
206. See, e.g., Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 814 F.2d 290, 296 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that
if no substantial similarity is determined in the context of a copyright claim, "then the
trademark claim must also fail"); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that a conclusion that a copyright claim cannot be sustained because of
lack of substantial similarity precludes a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)); Warner Bros.
Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the absence of
substantial similarity leaves little room for assertion of a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
One court has held, however, that the expiration of a copyright need not bar a trademark
or trade dress claim. See Tempo Communications, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 223
U.S.P.Q. 721, 722 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
207. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Colo. 1986),
affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988). Compare Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.,
429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that "remarkable similarity" between two card
lines, including text and images identical but for "minor variations in color and style," is
sufficient proof of infringement), with Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1274 (finding that pro-
tection granted "does not extend the protection available under trademark law and does
not conflict with the policy of copyright law").
208. See Warner Bros., 720 F.2d at 246.
209. 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982). Professor Brown wittily observed of this case that
"[c]opyrights eventually expire. What the court has done in DC Comics, since trademarks
can last forever, is to safeguard Superman from ever facing the rough-and-tumble of the
public domain, which might undo even Superman." Brown, supra note 6, at 1370 (foot-
note omitted).
210. In re DC Comics, 689 F.2d at 1043.
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not be used at all by others."211 Examples such as these demonstrate
that, because it covers the same intrinsically valuable intellectual prop-
erty that copyright, covers, virtual trade dress effectively threatens to
render a privileged class of copyrights immortal.
2. Virtual Trade Dress vs. Design Patent Law.-Does trade dress
similarly threaten to prolong the life of design patents? Again, case
law suggests that, in general, it does not. Rather than barring trade
dress protection in the same subject matter, a design patent offers re-
buttable proof that its sibling trade dress is not functional. 212 More
pointedly, despite broad language to the contrary in Supreme Court
cases like Sears,21 3 CoMpco,2 14 and Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,215
courts have held consistently that trademark protection does not con-
flict with design patent protection.216 The court in Kohler Co. v. Moen
Inc.2 17 justified its willingness to allow overlapping design patent and
trademark rights by observing that while a patent gives "the exclusive
right to make and sell the innovation, a trademark gives the owner
211. Id. at 1052 n.6 (Nies, J., specially concurring). Because the copyright had not yet
expired, Judge Nies left the problem for a future court. See id. The issue thus remains
unlitigated.
212. See In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that a
design patent provides some evidence of nonfunctionality, but is not alone sufficient proof
thereof); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
("[D]esign patent ... indicates that the design is not dejure functional."); In re Honeywell,
Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q. 576, 578 (T.T.A.B. 1975) ("[T]he criteria utilized to determine the pat-
entability of a design patent are in no way determinative of the registrability of the same
design as a trademark .... ."), affid, 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
213. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) ("An unpatentable
article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain and may be
made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.").
214. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964) ("Day-Brite's
fixture has been held not to be entitled to a design or mechanical patent. Under the
federal patent laws it is, therefore, in the public domain and can be copied in every detail
by whoever pleases.").
215. 305 U.S. 111, 119-20 (1938) ("[Ulpon expiration of the patents the form.., was
dedicated to the public.").
216. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
availability of design patent protection for a faucet and handle does not bar suit for in-
fringement of trademark in same); Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding that the availability of design patent protection for an auto body does not
bar protection of trademark in same); In re World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012,
1015 (C.C.PA. 1973) (holding that an expired design patent in candy bar packaging does
not bar the registration of trademark in same); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d
925, 930 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (holding that a design patent in a wine bottle does not bar regis-
tration of trademark in same).
217. 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
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only the right to preclude others from using the mark when such use
is likely to cause confusion or to deceive." 18
Although this distinction holds up well in product packaging
cases," 9 it falters in product configuration cases.22° Trade dress in
product configuration cases comes uncomfortably close to constitut-
ing the very commodity that consumers value. 21 The protection that
such trade dress grants against confusingly similar copies thus pro-
vides a far more valuable right than mere protection from confusingly
similar packaging.
That a design patent theoretically prohibits all substantially simi-
lar copies-whether they confuse consumers or not-offers scant
practical advantage. In the first place, design patents, arguably, only
protect against unauthorized copies embodied in the same type of
product.222 Because they aim at preventing consumer confusion,223
trade dress rights have a similar scope. Nevertheless, even if design
patent rights spread across product boundaries, it would matter little.
Few people want to copy a faucet's design for anything other than a
faucet, for example, nor would a patent holder especially care if some-
one applied the design to a tennis racquet. Furthermore, if such use
offends, trade dress seems at least as likely to offer relief as does a
design patent. After all, courts have found a likelihood of confusion
sufficient to give rise to trademark infringement between such appar-
ently unrelated products as magazines and girdles,2 2 4 flashlights and
locks, 225 pipes and Scotch whiskey,226 and groceries and real estate. 22 7
The recent creation of a federal right against trademark dilution
218. Id. at 637 (citation omitted).
219. See, e.g., In re World's Finest Chocolate, 474 F.2d at 1012 (candy bar packaging).
220. See, e.g., Kohler, 12 F.3d 632 (faucet and handle); Esercizio, 944 F.2d 1235 (auto
body).
221. In other words, it comes uncomfortably close to virtual trade dress. As long as the
products in question retain value independent of their trade dress, however, they avoid
falling all of the way into virtual trade dress status.
222. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994), which specifies that only a "new, original and ornamen-
tal design for an article of manufacture" will qualify for design patent protection. Id. (empha-
sis added). Design patent claims thus typically read: "The ornamental design for [a
particular object], as shown and described." Ex parte Strijland, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1259, 1260
(Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f. 1992). Courts likewise read section 171 to bar claims to free-floating
designs: "The factor which distinguishes statutory design subject matter from mere pic-
tures or surface ornamentation per se (i.e., abstract designs) is the embodiment of the
design in an article of manufacture." Id. at 1262.
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994).
224. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948).
225. See Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
226. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Kasser Distillers Prods. Corp., 350 F. Supp.
1341 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1973).
227. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1962).
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makes it even easier for a court to find that trade dress rights travel
across product boundaries.228
Although a design patent theoretically offers unique protection
against copies too clearly labeled to allow consumer confusion 229 _
and, thus, an infringement claim for nonfamous trade dress2S0 -this
supposed benefit evaporates in practice. A disclaimer made clear
enough to ward off confusion may so mar the design in question that
it negates the benefits of honest copying. Hallmark would have won
little in the Hartford House litigation,31 for example, had the court
allowed it to compete only on the condition that it stamp disclaimers
across the front of the suspect cards. The risk of trade dress dilution
claims 23 2 and the willingness of courts to bar even clearly labeled cop-
228. See 15 U.S.CA. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 1997). The new provision, entitled "Reme-
dies for dilution of famous marks," provides, in part:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name,
if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this subsection. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court
may consider factors such as, but not limited to-
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods
or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services in which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction
is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the [Trade-Mark] Act of March 3,
1881, or the [Trade-Mark] Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register.
Id. § (c)(1).
229. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1993) (asserting that a
patent gives the owner an exclusive right to an innovation whether or not its use by others
would cause confusion).
230. See 15 U.S.CA. § 1125(c) (protecting famous marks from dilution).
231. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Colo. 1986),
affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
232. See, e.g., Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (affirming under New York law a verdict of trademark dilution of furniture having a
nautical look); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming under New York law a preliminary injunction barring dilu-
tion of cheerleader uniforms); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994) (federal antidilution
provision).
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ies of trade dress2 s3 further whittle away at the supposed advantages of
design patent protection. Virtual trade dress rights thus come very
close, in practice, to creating potentially immortal design patents. 4
3. Virtual Trade Dress vs. The Constitution.-Suppose that virtual
trade dress rights conflict with rights granted under copyright and
patent law. Does that render virtual trade dress unconstitutional? In
dicta, courts have often stressed that Article I, Section 8, Clause 823
empowers Congress to provide exclusive rights only of limited dura-
tion.23 6 The court in Marx v. United States 1 7 directly grappled with the
issue. To avoid the unconstitutional alternative of an everlasting copy-
right, the Marx court interpreted the 1909 Copyright Act2 a3 to impose
a twenty-eight-year limit on the works in question.23 9 "It is not to be
assumed that a more extended measure of protection was intended,"
the court explained, because "[1]egislative enactments are to be con-
strued, if possible, in such way as to render them constitutional."2"
233. See, e.g., Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Judge Kennedy criticized the majority for not allowing the use of the trade
dress together with adequate labeling. Id. He added that "[t]he majority's remedy goes
well beyond protection of consumers against confusion as to a product's source. It pro-
tects the design itself from being copied." Id.
234. See Gifford, supra note 6, at 786. "When the design is an important factor in mar-
keting the product, the protection of product design under the rubric of trademark law
creates a new substantive area of protection in which it performs functions essentially simi-
lar to copyright, patent, and other substantive areas of intellectual property protection."
Id.
235. See supra note 192.
236. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The
court stated:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited
nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather .... [they
serve] to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of
a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
Id. at 429 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of com-
peting claims upon the public interest.... ."); Classic Film Museum, Inc. v. Warner Bros.,
Inc., 597 F.2d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1979) (arguing that granting the holder of a perpetual com-
mon law copyright unending rights over derivative works in the public domain would "swal-
low the rule of limited monopoly found in the constitution and copyright statutes");
Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that
the Constitution gave Congress the power to secure authors' rights "only 'for limited
Times,' and did not allow a perpetual copyright"), affd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
237. 96 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1938).
238. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1909) (repealed 1978).
239. Marx 96 F.2d at 206.
240. Id. (citation omitted).
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In a related vein, the court in Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.
v. Duracraft Corp.24 1 barred trade dress protection of a product config-
uration on the grounds that to hold otherwise would effectively-and
unconstitutionally-render a patent immortal.242 Commentators like-
wise agree that the Constitution prohibits Congress from passing stat-
utes, or courts from giving effect to statutes, so as to create potentially
unending copyrights or patents. 43
4. Virtual Trade Dress vs. Congressional Intent.-Beyond the fact
that virtual trade dress violates a federal policy of assigning specific
rights to and limitations on existing categories of intellectual prop-
erty,24 and may even violate the Constitution,245 virtual trade dress
contravenes the implied intent of Congress not to protect product de-
signs. Congress has consistently and repeatedly refused to enact legis-
lation to protect the same subject matter that, thanks to judicial fiat,
virtual trade dress has come to protect.2 46 As typically proves true in
questions of policy, the several arguments against virtual trade dress
still leave room for spirited public debate. That virtual trade dress
runs counter to so many general policy considerations, however, in
addition to legal doctrines specific to trade dress, amounts to damn-
ing criticism indeed.
241. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
242. Id. at 1500 (holding that trade dress cannot prolong the life of a utility patent so as
to prevent a product configuration from falling into the public domain).
243. See, e.g., Oscar Cargill & Patrick A. Moran, Copyright Duration v. The Constitution, 17
WAYNE L. REv. 917, 927-29 (1971) (stating that "life plus" copyright terms unconstitution-
ally exceed the "limited Times" provision of art. 1, § 8, cl. 8); Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional
Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitu-
tion: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEA-rLE U. L. Rxv. 259, 287
(1995) (stating that the constitutional phrase "limited Times" bars Congress from granting
authors and inventors eternal exclusive rights to their creations); R. Anthony Reese, Note,
Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47
STAN. L. REv. 707, 722 n.66 (1995) (asserting without analysis that a perpetual copyright
would violate the Copyright Clause of the Constitution). Though working without any on-
point case law, commentators have also argued that the Commerce Clause does not allow
Congress to avoid the limits set forth in the Intellectual Property Clause. See, e.g.,JohnJ.
Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of the Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L.
RExv. 389, 402 (1992) (arguing that the grant of a seven-year exclusive marketing right by
the Orphan Drug Act unconstitutionally exceeds the limitations of the Patent Clause of the
Constitution); Pollack, supra, at 288 ("While courts have alluded to possible reinforcement
of the Intellectual Property Clause with the Commerce Clause, no court has suggested that
Congress may by pass the 'limited times' provision.").
244. See supra Part VI.C.1-2.
245. See supra Part VI.C.3.
246. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1446 (3d Cir.
1994); Brown, supra note 6, at 1395; Gleiberman, supra note 6, at 2070.
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D. Virtual Trade Dress and Aesthetic Functionality
Grappling with the doctrine of "aesthetic functionality" gives
courts and commentators headaches.247 Fortunately, the present
analysis need not inflict similar discomfort. It suffices here to show
that virtual trade dress does not represent simply another formulation
of the aesthetic functionality problem. As the very commodity that
consumers value, rather than mere ornamentation on something in-
dependently valuable, virtual trade dress merits condemnation on
other, less controversial, grounds.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set
forth the most well-known test for aesthetic functionality: "If the par-
ticular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of
the product, the interest in free competition permits its imitation in
the absence of a patent or copyright."248 Other courts have criticized
this doctrine. 49 The Ninth Circuit has thus partially retreated, ex-
plaining that it will not find an identifying mark functional, and, con-
sequently, will not bar protection, solely on the grounds that the mark
"contributes to the consumer appeal and saleability of the
product."250
Virtual trade dress looks suspect under either the original or re-
vised version of the Ninth Circuit's test of aesthetic functionality. Vir-
tual trade dress goes much further than constituting an "important
ingredient in the commercial success of the product"2 51 or contribut-
ing "to consumer appeal and ... the sale of the products."252 As the
very commodity that consumers value, virtual trade dress represents
the most important ingredient in a product's commercial success and
saleability. Considering the strength of the doctrines discussed ear-
lier,253 however, courts need not rely on aesthetic functionality to rule
out virtual trade dress.
247. See, e.g., McCARThY, supra note 37, § 7.26[51, at 7-152.4 to -152.5 (stating that the
doctrine "is much too open-ended and vague to be a useful rule of law," is based on "mis-
leading semantics" and "an oxymoron," and "may be a theory in search of a rationale").
248. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
249. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981)
(arguing that defining aesthetic functionality based on its commercial desirability "pro-
vides a disincentive for development of imaginative and attractive design"); In re DC
Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1045 (C.C.PA 1982) (arguing that the test "obscures the
distinction between utilitarian and aesthetic functionality").
250. Vuitton et Fils SA. v.J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1981).
251. Pagiero, 198 F.2d at 343.
252. Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 774.
253. See supra Part VIA-C.
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It bears noting that McCarthy's suggested alternative to the aes-
thetic functionality doctrine-the traditional "merely ornamental"
test254-may in practice fail to sort out virtual trade dress. McCarthy
would have courts ask: "Is the disputed feature in fact perceived by
customers as a trademark or not?"255 If properly applied, this test
might detect virtual trade dress in its infancy. Once it takes root,
though, virtual trade dress resists extermination. As McCarthy notes
elsewhere, courts sometimes mistake the popularity of an established
design as evidence that it has acquired secondary meaning. 56 The
merely ornamental test would thus feed a vicious cycle of monopoliza-
tion by failing to condemn virtual trade dress that has, by dint of use
under legal sanction, acquired secondary meaning.257 As argued ear-
lier, however, trade dress protection of an intrinsically valuable com-
modity merits condemnation because it violates established law and
wise public policy. 258
Although not responsible for encouraging abuse, the merely or-
namental test does too little to prevent it. Courts need an independ-
ent arbiter of valid trade dress status. Courts should thus ask not only
whether a design constitutes mere ornamentation on a commodity,
but also whether the design constitutes the commodity itself. Only by
taking this additional step can courts ward off the hazards of virtual
trade dress.
E. Virtual Trade Dress and Autographic Trade Dress
Virtual trade dress raises issues similar to, though distinct from, a
trademark or trade dress valued because it indicates affiliation with an
independent good or service. Examples of the latter type of mark in-
clude the insignia of a fraternal organization 259 or the emblem of a
sports team.26° Judge Alex Kozinski has whimsically labeled such
marks "unplugged" because they have "certain functional characteris-
tics that are different from-and sometimes inconsistent with-their
254. MCCARYm, supra note 37, § 7.2b[5], at 7-152.5.
255. Id.
256. See id. § 7.26[4] [b], at 7-142.2 (criticizing finding of court in Wallace International
Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990), that consumers' appre-
ciation of a popular design as "classiest" showed that it had acquired secondary meaning).
257. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v.Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1447 (3d Cir. 1994)
(arguing that "any perceptible product feature" could distinguish goods if "nobody else
were allowed to copy it").
258. See supra Part VIA-C.
259. See International Order ofJob's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th
Cir. 1980) (trademark insignia of fraternal organization).
260. See Boston Prot! Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir. 1975) (trademark emblem of sports team).
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traditional role as identifiers of source." 6' Calling these marks "auto-
graphic" sheds more light on their nature because, like a celebrity's
signature, they both identify a source and establish positive associa-
tions with a related good or service. 62
Although the case law addresses only autographic trademarks,
2 63
nothing bars trade dress from also acting in an autographic capacity.
It need merely have sufficient secondary meaning to remind consum-
ers of an affiliated good or service. Such (hypothetical) autographic
trade dress would share some, but not all, of the features of virtual
trade dress. Each has value without referring to the source of the par-
ticular commodity to which it attaches or that it embodies. In the case
of autographic trade dress, for example, warm-up suits that mimic
those worn by the University of Chicago football team would sell (as-
suming they did) not because consumers think that the sweats come
from the Maroons, but rather because consumers want to look like the
(original) "Monsters of the Midway." In other words, autographic
trade dress, like virtual trade dress, does not identify residual hidden
qualities. Furthermore, each type of trade dress risks invalidation on
functional grounds because it has features that satisfy consumer
demand.
264
261. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 960, 962 (1993) (footnote
omitted). In W.T. Rogers Go. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985), the court stated:
In an age when fashion-conscious consumers wear T-shirts emblazoned with the
trademarks of consumer products and owners of Volkswagens buy conversion kits
to enable them to put a Rolls Royce grille on their car, it is apparent that trade
names, symbols, and design features often serve a dual purpose, one part of which
is functional in the sense of making the product more attractive, and is distinct
from identifying the manufacturer or his brand to the consumer.
Id. at 340.
262. Celebrity signatures can also attain value by merit of their scarcity, however. The
metaphor thus works best if one understands the term "autograph" to include copies of
signatures, which often appear in advertisements touting celebrity endorsements.
263. See, e.g., Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d 912; Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified
Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977) (trademark in chicken franchise's contain-
ers and accouterments); Boston Prof l Hockey Ass'n, 510 F.2d 1004 (trademark emblem of
professional sports team); University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp.
711 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (trademark in university insignia). But see Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (treating as trademarks
features better described as trade dress).
264. See, e.g., Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 917 (finding that a feature is functional if it
constitutes "the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from
an assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product"); Champion,
566 F. Supp. at 720-21 (finding that the university's insignia is a functional element of
shirts). But see, e.g., Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n, 510 F.2d at 1012 ("The argument that confu-
sion must be as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive,
where the trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of
the emblem.").
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Autographic trade dress differs from virtual trade dress in vital
respects, however. The value of autographic trade dress depends cru-
cially on its affiliation with a particular source. People wore the once
ubiquitous Batman T-shirt, for example, not to benefit from its intrin-
sic elegance but rather to associate themselves with the movie mar-
keted under the same black and yellow symbol. Virtual trade dress, on
the other hand, represents the very commodity that consumers desire.
Autographic trade dress finds its analog in a celebrity's signature, de-
sired for the cachet of fame. Virtual trade dress, in contrast, calls to
mind a map scrawled by a helpful stranger for a lost traveler. The
map proves helpful despite its anonymous source, whereas the stran-
ger's signature counts for nothing. Virtual trade dress, unlike auto-
graphic trade dress, has intrinsic value.
This distinction between autographic trade dress and virtual
trade dress has legal repercussions. Autographic trade dress ulti-
mately draws its value from trademarks or trade dress operating in
conventional manners in other contexts. Autographic trade dress
thus raises a question of dilution. 265 Virtual trade dress bypasses these
issues because its value does not rely on associations with conventional
trademarks or trade dress.
VI. THE FuTuRE OF VIRTUAL TRADE DREss
A. A Virtual Disaster
If current trends continue, we may find courts awarding over-
broad trade dress rights to computer-user interfaces and virtual envi-
ronments. The designers of such software outputs have very strong
incentives to protect their work and will aggressively seek out all possi-
ble means of doing so. Because virtual trade dress upsets existing cat-
egories of intellectual property, it threatens to throw off the present
balance between rewarding creation and allowing competition. The
following three hypothetical examples, drawn from After Dark (a
screen saver program), Myst (a CD-ROM game), and Snow Crash266 (a
fictional account of a virtual reality), demonstrate the unjustifiably
broad monopolies that trade dress might come to defend.
265. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken, 549 F.2d at 388-89 (explaining that, despite Boston
Prorl Hockey Ass'n, past cases "demonstrate unbroken insistence upon likelihood of confu-
sion, and by doing so they reject any notion that a trademark is an owner's 'property' to be
protected irrespective of its role in the operation of our markets"); see aLso 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1125(c) (West Supp. 1997) (creating a federal right against trademark dilution).
266. NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CR.AsH (1992).
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1. After Dark.-A screen saver program projects changing
images on a computer's video output after a predetermined length of
time has passed since the computer user's most recent input.267 Orig-
inally, these programs aimed at protecting computers' video tubes
from image "burn-in."26 8 Although technological advances have since
rendered this function unnecessary, screen savers remain a popular
source of entertainment. 269 "'A screen saver isn't a protective device
anymore; it's a delivery method for content.' 2 70 Those that create
screen saver images view them, with some justification, as "'computer
poetry.' 271
The most famous screen saver program, After Dark, features
whimsical flocks of flying toasters.27 2 Suppose that the creator of After
Dark, Berkeley Systems, Inc., claimed trade dress rights in the distinc-
tive images27s generated by its screen saver program. The claim seems
quite plausible given precedent like Hartford House.274 Its success
would give Berkeley Systems potentially eternal rights over the use of
these or similar images in potentially confusing contexts-that is, on
computer screens. 275 Does that seem like a bit much? Blame virtual
trade dress.
An up-and-running screen saver program provides little or no
residual hidden value.2 76 Take away the images that the program puts
on the computer screen and you take away the very commodity that
267. See Chris Reidy, Hits for the Small Screen: "Screen Savers" Get Second Career As Entertain-
ment, Advertising, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 18, 1994, at Al, available in 1994 WL 6014469.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. Id. (quoting Josef Zankowicz, spokesperson for a company that produces screen
savers based on comic strips).
271. Id. (quoting Stephen Linhart, an artist who has created works appearing in Berke-
ley Systems, Inc.'s screen saver, After Dark).
272. See id.
273. In truth, the images are perhaps not so distinctive. In October 1994, representa-
tives of the defunct rock group Jefferson Airplane sued Berkeley Systems, Inc. for copyright
infringement, claiming that the image of flying toasters came from the cover of the group's
1973 album, Thirty Seconds over Winterland The federal district court hearing the suit dis-
missed it on grounds that the group's copyright covered only its sound recording. See
CORP. LEGAL TIMS, Jan. 1995, at 34.
274. 649 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Colo. 1986), affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
275. The new federal right against dilution of famous marks would, of course, merely
increase the opportunity for obtaining such monopolies. See 15 U.S.CA § 1125(c) (West
Supp. 1997).
276. Tom G. Palmer has argued, in conversation with the Author, that screen saver pro-
grams can possess residual hidden values, such as operating system compatibility and pro-
viding freedom from computer viruses. Conventional trademarks and trade dress suffice
to identify these traits, however, at the program's point of sale. Images generated during
the screen saver's operation thus offer very little additional information.
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consumers value. Giving Berkeley Systems the sole right to those
images (or confusingly similar or diluting variations of them) would
thus give it the sole right to market a valuable product. Basing that
right in trade dress would render it potentially immortal. No software
manufacturer deserves so broad a claim to intellectual property.
Berkeley Systems may deserve some other sort of intellectual
property rights in its flying toasters, of course. Current case law might
bar it from obtaining a design patent in its images.277 Berkeley Sys-
tems has already successfully asserted its copyright, however, to enjoin
a rival screen saver that featured a cartoon character, Opus the Pen-
guin, from firing a rifle at flying toasters.278 Copyright should con-
tinue to protect the images in After Dark from substantially similar
imitations for many-though fortunately not countless-years.
2. Myst.-Could Broderbund and Cyan win virtual trade dress
rights to the CD-ROM game Myst?279 Myst does offer a residual hid-
den commodity: a vast, maddening puzzle laced with clues."8 ° A great
portion of the pleasure of playing Myst comes from unraveling its mys-
teries, a commodity that remains very well hidden indeed. Myst also
offers purely sensual delights, such as exotic, detailed images and
haunting music.2"' Myst thus mixes experience commodities and in-
spection commodities, rather like the restaurants in Two Pesos and
Fuddruckers. Those cases, as well as Romm Art,28 2 suggest that
Broderbund and Cyan could get trade dress protection in their
software's purely sensual aspects. As the analysis above argues, how-
ever, this would represent not real trade dress but rather virtual trade
dress. 83 Myst's creators should thus get no more trade dress protec-
tion than that on the outside of their product's box or, perhaps, in the
277. SeeExparteStrijland, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1259, 1263 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f. 1992) (hold-
ing that an applicant for a design patent in a computer icon must show that the claimed
element constitutes an active component in the operation of the computer, and not
merely a "displayed picture," by showing, for example, that clicking on or otherwise
manipulating the element initiates functional operations). But see Ken Liebman et al., The
Shape of Things to Come: Design-Patent Protection for Computers, 9 No. 11 COMPUTER LAw. 1, 4
(1992) (criticizing the approach in Ex parte Strijland as effectively rendering the claimed
element functional and thus unworthy of design patent protection).
278. See Reidy, supra note 267. After having lost to Berkeley Systems, the defendant
avoided the injunction by having Opus shoot at toasters held aloft by helicopter rotors
rather than by wings. See id.
279. See Robert Rossney, The Eerie, Haunting World of Myst: CD-ROM Game Draws Adults
into Compelling Adventure, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1994, at El, available in 1994 WL 4063820.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
283. See supra Part II.
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opening screens of their game.2" 4 Granting any more trade dress pro-
tection than this would give Broderbund and Cyan trade dress rights
to the very product that consumers value.
3. Stephenson's Metaverse.-Virtual reality has yet to see wide use
or defining litigation, so we can only imagine how existing trade dress
law would apply to this new technology. Neal Stephenson's science
fiction novel, Snow Crash,2" 5 provides an especially useful tool for this
exercise. It portrays several sorts of computer environments and thus
serves as something like a virtualvirtual reality." 6 Snow Crash includes
descriptions of the Metaverse (an entirely on-line world)2" 7 and the
Black Sun (a bar in the Metaverse) .288
The Metaverse assumes the form of a huge black sphere.2 8 9 Be-
cause the Metaverse serves as a common meeting ground for all man-
ner of visitors, its dimensions were "fixed by a protocol, hammered
out by the computer-graphics ninja overlords of the Association for
Computing Machinery's Global Multimedia Protocol Group."" 0 The
characteristics of the Metaverse affect its function, supporting stan-
dards that allow a wide range of different types of software to interface
in its environment." t
Because this packaging defines standards that serve a functional
purpose, it would probably not win trade dress protection. 2 As one
commentary states: "Features that make a product easier to use, or
even those that users might become accustomed to as a 'standard,'
appear likely to be deemed functional and thus unprotectable. '293 Of
course, the shape and appearance of the Metaverse may embody some
other sort of intellectual property.294
284. But see Kellner, Computer User, supra note 5, at 359-60 (arguing that trade dress pro-
tection of software extends beyond the point of sale to encompass user interface); Kellner,
Trade Dress, supra note 5, at 1031-33 (arguing that trade dress protects consumers against
the likelihood of confusion beyond the point of sale).
285. STEPHENSON, supra note 266.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 23-25.
288. Id. at 37, 50-51.
289. Id. at 23.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 25.
292. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. C. Itoh & Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. 598 (D.NJ. 1985) (find-
ing that keyboard layout, though initially aesthetic and nonfunctional, had become a stan-
dard and thus was disqualified from trade dress protection by merit of its functionality).
293. Liebman et al,, supra note 5, at 5.
294. Note that as a standard format it may also fail to win protection under copyright
law. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding menu command hierarchy an uncopyrightable method of operation), affd per
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More relevant to present purposes, this example demonstrates
that virtual packaging may serve functional purposes more frequently
than real-space packaging does. Thus, the former type of packaging
should more frequently fail to qualify for trade dress protection. 95 In
a world built solely of information, containers may serve as interfaces
rather than as mere wrappers. In the Metaverse, for example, people
swap databases by handing each other virtual hypercards.296
This confusion between appearances and functions also surfaces
in a second example from Snow Crash: the Black Sun. 29 7 The Black
Sun ranks as the hippest bar in the Metaverse, with a trade dress that
tends toward the austere.298 Its exterior presents a simple, squat,
black pyramid. 99 Inside, "the decor consists of black, square table-
tops hovering in the air (it would be pointless to draw in legs), evenly
spaced across the floor in a grid.""° °
If the Black Sun's architecture and design served solely as decora-
tion, it would probably win the same trade dress protection as its real-
space counterparts, the Two Pesos and Fuddruckers restaurants. It
would likewise raise the same questions about overextending trade
dress rights. It looks as if the Black Sun's architecture says more about
economics than aesthetics, however. Stephenson explains that the
hackers who "wrote" the Black Sun "didn't have enough money to
hire architects or designers, so they just went in for simple geometric
shapes."01 Likewise, the interior decor of the Black Sun appears to
serve a functional purpose: "Everything is matte black, which makes it
curiam, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (4-4 decision); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1992) (arguing that certain structural elements of computer pro-
grams are ideas and not expressions and, therefore, cannot be copyrighted); Plains Cotton
Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987)
(denying an injunction against the use of a computer program on the basis that it was not
copyrightable); Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1014
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that the input formats of computer programs are ideas and not
expressions and, therefore, not copyrightable). The Supreme Court's enigmatic, dead-
locked affirmance in Lotus failed to completely settle this area of copyright law, however,
arguably leaving the circuits split. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,
797 F.2d 1222, 1240 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that the structure of a computer program
is part of the expression of the program and not the idea and is, therefore, copyrightable).
295. The bar on functional trade dress represents not a statutory doctrine, but rather a
judicial one. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
("This requirement of 'nonfunctionality' is not mandated by statute, but 'is deduced en-
tirely from court decisions.'").
296. STEPHENSON, supra note 266, at 102-03.
297. Id. at 50.
298. Id. at 37, 50-51.
299. Id. at 37.
300. Id. at 50.
301. Id. at 37.
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a lot easier for the computer system to draw things in on top of it-no
worries about filling in a complicated background.""'2 The simple in-
terior and exterior design of the Black Sun thus does more than
merely create a cyberpunk atmosphere.303 It also reduces the compu-
tational burdens of creating and running the Black Sun, and, presum-
ably, the proprietors' costs °304 Does this render trade dress law
inapplicable? Probably not.
The Black Sun's competitors would have many alternative geo-
metric shapes and matte color backgrounds from which to choose.
The Black Sun's owners also could argue forcefully that, as in Two
Pesos and Fuddruckers, these individually functional elements combine
to create a nonfunctional whole. Furthermore, like the restaurants in
Two Pesos and Fuddruckers, the Black Sun offers more than mere decor;
its built-in software expels disruptive and infectious guests, making the
Black Sun a popular and safe meeting place.30 5
Nevertheless, any claim to the Black Sun's trade dress would still
cover a good deal of the same product-the hip noir atmosphere-
that its customers value. The proprietors of the Black Sun could thus
win virtual trade dress rights to intrinsically valuable features of their
service and wield those rights against competing hot spots. Indeed,
the rush to grab rights to the Black Sun's trade dress has already
started; Viacom New Media has announced a forthcoming CD-ROM
action-adventure game based on Stephenson's Snow Crash.30 6 Viacom
claims that it has "attempted to retain the book's flavor by keeping
core elements of the Metaverse-such as the Black Sun,"30 7 and prer-
elease screen shots from the game indicate that it aims to recreate
Stephenson's imagery.30 8 Arguments that these types of game envi-
ronments operate as trade dress should soon follow.
B. A Real Improvement
These examples from After Dark, Myst, and Snow Crash illustrate
that the brave new world of virtual reality holds significant potential
for the abuse of trade dress law. In any circumstance in which con-
sumers value a virtual environment for its aesthetic qualities, over-
broad trade dress claims threaten to provide unduly expansive and
302. Id. at 50-51.
303. Id. at 37, 50-51.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 51.
306. See Kristin Lowe, 100 Percent Pure Adrenaline, WIRED, July 1996, at 143.
307. Id.
308. See id.
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long-lived intellectual property rights. These circumstances will surely
increase as computer interfaces and virtual environments become
more detailed, realistic, and beautiful. We should expect to see virtual
environments evolve into something like architecture: pleasant and
universally accessible backdrops for the more active pursuits of work
and play. In this capacity, virtual environments will, like the cards in
Hartford House or the prints in Romm Art, stand alone as desiderata and
identify no other commodity. These virtual environments should not
win trade dress protection.
1. Intrinsic Limits on Virtual Trade Dress.-Despite the risks it
poses, virtual trade dress does not threaten to entirely consume intel-
lectual property rights in virtual reality. First, rights to a particular
trade dress might fail to protect individual functional elements that
combine to create it. It seems likely that many aspects of on-line envi-
ronments will serve as standards or functional interfaces, thus disquali-
fying them from trade dress protection. Of course, trade dress does
cover unique configurations of individually functional elements.3 0 9
Virtual trade dress could thus provide a monopoly on a particular style
of World Wide Web page, for example, if not the particular buttons
built into it.
Second, virtual trade dress would not protect in their entirety dig-
ital environments that qualify as functional. Increasingly, people work
as well as play on-line. 10 Commercial services will find it difficult to
claim trade dress rights in the same environments that they tout as
functional. In advertising, "You'll access data faster in our Dig-
itaLibrarym!", for example, a service provider would undermine its
trade dress rights to the very features of which it boasts.
Finally, some commentators have argued that trade dress protec-
tion suffers comparative disadvantages to copyright protection. 1
Moreover, in some circumstances, the likelihood of confusion test of
trade dress infringement might offer less coverage than the substan-
tial similarity test of copyright infringement.312 The defendant in a
copyright infringement suit gains little, for example, by having affixed
309. See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir.
1987) ("[Flunctional elements that are separately unprotectable can be protected together
as part of a trade dress.").
310. Jake Kirchner, Inside, PC MAG., Oct. 8, 1996, at 4. This entire issue is devoted to
articles about tools for performing work on the Internet.
311. See, e.g., Liebman et al., supra note 5, at 7-8 (arguing that "copyright protection for
software is easier to obtain and affords broader protection" than trade dress or
trademarks).
312. But see supra Part VI.C.1.
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disclaimers to inform consumers of the actual source of offending
copies. 13 In a similar vein, the same derivative work that infringes a
copyright could pose too low a risk of confusion to support a trade
dress infringement claim. 14 Note, however, that copyright protection
might fail to cover the most important aspects of virtual environments;
it looks increasingly doubtful that copyright law protects the "look and
feel" of computer interfaces.31 5
2. Curbing Virtual Trade Dress.-Despite some inherent limita-
tions, virtual trade dress remains a problem. Courts can curb it, how-
ever, through a variety of measures. Courts should simply refuse to
recognize claims to pure virtual trade dress. They can detect it by
asking if the claimed trade dress in fact constitutes the commodity
that consumers value and then disallow it as either functional, inher-
ently nondistinctive, or both. 16
In many cases virtual trade dress will come mixed with the real
thing. Given the importance of free competition, courts should avoid
foreclosing all access to the trade dress in question. Courts should
thus force competitors to apply just enough disclaimers and labeling
to ward off consumer confusion.3 17 Furthermore, courts should de-
mand less labeling from defendants as the trade dress in question falls
more heavily on the virtual side of the scale. Requiring disclaimers
not only hinders competition by increasing defendants' costs, in the
case of virtual trade dress, it can hinder competition by rendering the
commodity in question less valuable. For example, had Hallmark es-
313. See Liebman et al., supra note 5, at 7. This same defense would not ward off a trade
dress dilution claim, either. See, e.g., Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming the verdict of trade dress dilution under New York law of furni-
ture having a nautical look); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,
604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming a preliminary injunction barring dilution under
New York law of cheerleader uniform).
314. Again, such a derivative work may give rise to a trade dress dilution claim. See 15
U.S.CA § 1125(c) (West Supp. 1997).
315. See supra note 294; see a/soJohn Hornick, Computer Program Copyrights: Look and Feel
No Evil, 5 SoFrWARE L.J. 355, 355 (1992) ("[T]he extent to which copyright protection
extends to its nonliteral elements, such as ... its so-called look and feel, is still unclear.");
Jack Russo & Jamie Nafziger, Software "Look and Feel" Protection in the 1990s, 15 HASTINGS
COMM. & EN'r. L.J. 571, 577 (1993) (describing the "conflicting judicial opinions" regard-
ing the copyright protection of the "look and feel" of computer software).
316. See supra Part VI.B.1-2.
317. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (holding
that a state may make appropriate labeling laws to "prevent customers from being misled as
to the source," but may not prohibit the copying of unpatented or uncopyrighted articles);
Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The
proper remedy is to require identification of the source of the replica, not prohibit copy-
ing of the product.").
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caped the Hartford House litigation with only a disclaimer requirement,
forcing Hallmark to stamp a disclaimer in bold, red letters across the
face of offending cards would have effectively foreclosed competition.
In product design cases mixing real and virtual trade dress, courts
should also require the plaintiff to show secondary meaning."1 8
Although Two Pesos allows courts to find trade dress inherently distinc-
tive,3 ' 9 these courts should not seize on this option with regard to
trade dress that includes the very commodities that consumers value.
To the extent that trade dress itself represents a desideratum, consum-
ers cannot distinguish it from what the trade dress supposedly identi-
fies,32° nor will any amount of use in commerce change that fact. 2 '
CONCLUSION
Virtual reality offers exciting new worlds not only for people, but
also for legal doctrines. Its liberating and disorienting sweep will chal-
lenge us-and our laws-to adapt quickly. The sooner that we can
identify and prevent potential problems, the better. On these
grounds alone, virtual trade dress qualifies for eradication. Even
apart from its dark potential, however, virtual trade dress poses
problems right now.
Despite its pedigree in influential cases, virtual trade dress stands
on shaky ground. Not one of the economic justifications that support
conventional trade dress rights applies to trade dress that has intrinsic
value. Moreover, virtual trade dress fails to meet the traditional legal
standards of nonfunctionality and distinctiveness. Policy considera-
tions leave such trade dress looking unwise; legal considerations
might even render it unconstitutional.
318. See Gaske, supra note 67, at 1139 (arguing that finding secondary meaning is the
only appropriate test in these cases because the inherent distinctiveness test "improperly
expands trade dress protection into areas reserved for copyrights and patents").
319. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
320. See supra Part VI.B.1.
321. Note, however, the Supreme Court's statement in Two Pesos that "the general prin-
ciples qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part
applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under
§ 43(a)." Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (citations omitted). Section 1052(f) of 15 U.S.C. pro-
vides that in considering a mark for registration "[ t ] he Commissioner may accept as prima
facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive... proof of substantially exclusive and
continuous use thereof ... for the five years before the" registrant's claim of distinctive-
ness. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994). Perhaps a trade dress claimant could cite Two Pesos and
section 1052(f) in an argument to force a court to consider secondary meaning. A
counterargument: The Commissioner and courts routinely read into the preamble to sec-
tion 1052 a bar on generic marks. As noted supra Part VI.B.I., virtual trade dress qualifies,
in some sense, as even less distinctive than generic.
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Virtual environments no doubt qualify for protection from theft
and copying. Copyrights, licenses, design patents, and various techno-
logical fixes can do most of that work. Even trademark law has a role,
albeit one far smaller than a few errant courts have allowed. In virtual
reality, as elsewhere, trademarks and trade dress ought to do no more
than identify a commodity's source, and not do so much as to unduly
limit competition. Virtual trade dress thus already represents an aber-
ration of trademark law. If current legal and technological trends
continue, moreover, virtual trade dress could become a very real
problem.
